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Abstract 
 
Rapid declines in common pool resources worldwide have been a driver to shift 
fisheries management from government to co-management. During the last few 
decades, theoretical and practical issues of fisheries co-management have been 
widely documented, yet the building and implementation of fisheries co-management 
in developing country contexts, where co-management processes have been 
influenced by external agencies, has not been adequately addressed. This research 
aims to contribute to understanding about how co-management works in a 
developing country and to building successful fisheries co-management in Vietnam. 
In particular, it investigates how fisheries co-management emerged and became 
arranged; it analyses the factors affecting the development and implementation of 
fisheries co-management and the outcomes of the co-management. This research 
was conducted in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam where six nested case studies, 
fishing communities - represented by their Fishery Associations - were selected for 
the research. Data were collected from a survey (n=252) and 12 focus group 
discussions with fishers; semi-structured interviews with 27 people who were 
resource managers, co-management experts, project staff, policy makers and 
fishers; and secondary data where available. The findings show that (1) Co-
management in Tam Giang Lagoon was arranged between fishers’ organizations 
(Fishery Association - FA) and district government, with low involvement of the 
provincial level of government, which is responsible for fisheries policy, planning and 
legislation, in co-management processes. Co-management has evolved 
incrementally as a response to problems, rather than co-management being a 
consciously designed or negotiated system from the start. Further, the development 
of the co-management system was led by donor- funded projects and their 
involvement was crucial for starting co-management in the lagoon. However, the 
dominance of their project teams in building the co-management has left government 
in a passive position. The low participation of government in co-management 
processes, poor cooperation between the many different donor-funded projects, and 
lack of appropriate exit strategies of the projects, have resulted in an unsustainable 
and inconsistent co-management system. (2) Co-management has offered the 
opportunity to shift the fisheries governance into a new era where power can be 
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shared between government and fishers. However as the national and provincial 
legislative framework has lagged behind the co-management progress, fishers are 
unable to exercise the shared powers and this makes the fishers’ powers nominal 
rather than actual. (3) The leaders of FAs played an important role in successful co-
management in Tam Giang Lagoon. They have considerable influence on the 
participation of fishers in co-management. To be an influential leader in fishing 
communities, the leader should possess certain qualities such as fairness, 
accountability, acting as a role model, being a “servant leader”, professional 
competencies and social qualities, that enable him to organize resource users and 
help link the FA with government for co-management. (4) Despite the incomplete 
and inconsistent status of the co-management system, co-management has brought 
some positive social and ecological changes in the lagoon. Although there was not 
enough evidence to conclude an increase in fish stock in the lagoon since co-
management commenced in the mid-2000s, there was a measurable improvement in 
resource well-being with no further collapses in lagoon fisheries. The presence of co-
management has contributed to a considerable reduction in the violation of 
regulations and conflict between lagoon resource users. However, the positive social 
and ecological outcomes were reported and observed in only some parts of the 
lagoon. If the compliance with the regulations is not reinforced and especially if the 
number of Chinese Lu (a bottom fishing trap) is not controlled effectively, fishery 
degradation may recur in the future. The consistency of the co-management system, 
and the government policies and practices in support of the community in handling 
violators and enforcing regulations, are vital for the future of the lagoon system.  
Given that fisheries co-management is in its infancy in Vietnam and is still under 
development, the findings of this research are useful for government at different 
levels to build successful co-management systems in Vietnam. It also implies a need 
for the government to conduct an overview of the co-management system to gain the 
lessons and experiences from what has been done so far, to develop the system 
effectively.  
This study explores an entire process of a co-management system, that allows 
analysis of the interactions between different stages of a co-management process: 
design, arrangement, implementation and outcomes. It enables understanding of the 
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current co-management arrangement in relation to the way it was “born”. This study 
also reveals the practical issues of donor-funded projects, power, and the role of the 
fishers’ leaders in successful co-management, issues that have not been adequately 
addressed in literature.  
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Chapter 1    
Introduction and Background 
 
 
Plate 1: Aquaculture lower pond (right) and mobile fishing (far left) in Tam 
Giang Lagoon  
(Photo: Nga T T Ho) 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
1.1  Introduction  
Fisheries play an important part in social-economic development and food security 
throughout the world. Fish provides 16.7 per cent of the global population’s intake of 
animal protein and 6.5 per cent of all protein consumed (FAO 2014). Protein from 
fish is a vital nutritional source for billions of people in developing countries where 
total protein intake levels may be low (FAO 2014). In addition, fisheries provide 
employment for approximately 10-12 per cent of the world’s population - as many as 
58.3 million people are involved in the fishery sector, of which 37 per cent work full 
time in fisheries (FAO 2014).  
However, under the effect of different factors, fisheries resources are declining 
rapidly globally. More than 90 per cent of fish stocks worldwide are fully fished or 
overfished (FAO 2014). The high rates of population growth leading to a greater 
demand for food, together with the differences in economic development, resource 
use, and technological change are placing huge pressures on marine resources 
(Pomeroy et al. 2007). Environmental uncertainty and climate change have also 
contributed to the degradation of fisheries resources (Badjeck et al. 2010; Brander 
2010). More importantly, the ineffectiveness of the management systems has been 
widely accepted as one of the main causes of fisheries collapse (Defeo et al. 2007; 
Pomeroy et al. 2007; Cardinale & Svedäng 2008; Longhurst 2010; Pitcher & Lam 
2010; O’Leary et al. 2011).  
The degradation of fisheries resources worldwide together with the complexity in 
management of small scale fisheries has been a driver to shift fisheries management 
into a new era in which governments share fisheries management power and 
responsibility with resource users. This management approach is now well known as 
“co-management”. It has been widely applied in fisheries management in many 
countries including Vietnam.  
Co-management has been employed for management of a wide range of resources 
including the resources held under state property rights, private property rights, 
communal property and open access. However, co-management is mostly applied to 
the management of coastal common pool resources including fisheries because 
these types of resources are most vulnerable to depletion due to their open access 
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status (Pinkerton 1989a; Wilson et al. 2003). The introduction of co-management in 
fisheries is expected as a measure to halt the decline of fisheries resources by 
involving fishers in protection and management of the resources (Pinkerton 1989a). 
Co-management is about power and responsibility sharing between different parties. 
For some authors (Berkes et al. 1991; McCay 2002), co-management is the sharing 
of power and responsibilities between government and local people. For others such 
as IUCN (1996) and Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2000), co-management is a 
partnership not only between government and local people but also with other actors 
such as NGOs (Natcher et al. 2005). In some cases co-management is defined 
simply as the sharing of responsibility between government and user groups (Sen & 
Nielsen 1996). In general the definitions of co-management have the following 
implications: there is a linkage between concepts of co-management and natural 
resource management; that co-management is some kind of partnership between 
public and private actors. Co-management can also be considered as a process 
rather than a fixed state (Carlsson & Berkes 2005).  
The co-management arrangement between government and community can be 
“complete” or “incomplete” depending on the extent to which the management 
functions are jointly performed (Pinkerton 1989b). A co-management system is 
considered as complete if all management functions are performed jointly between 
government and community. Alternatively, if the intended sharing of management 
functions between government and community is not carried out fully, the co-
management is seen as incomplete. Depending the role of government and resource 
users in co-management, co-management can arrange from ds where resource 
users are only informed what government has decided to do, to the level where they 
are considered as a partner which is delegated with power by government (Berkes 
1994; Sen & Nielsen 1996).  
1.2 Background to the research  
In Vietnam marine fisheries play an important role the economy. With more than 
3,000 km of coastline, fisheries have become the third-most important economic 
sector in Vietnam, after the oil and garment industries (GSO, 2013). In 2012 fisheries 
contributed 4 per cent to the national GDP and made up 6.3 per cent of total 
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Vietnamese export revenues with an export value of US 6.2 billion (GSO,2013). In 
2012 Vietnam ranked the fifth in the world for fisheries export and the 13th for capture 
fisheries (FAO, 2014). About 4 million people were engaged in the fisheries sector, 
of which nearly 1.9 million people depend completely on fisheries. Fisheries also 
play an important role in food security in Vietnam. Fish accounts for 40 per cent of 
the daily protein intake of the Vietnamese diet. Fifty per cent of the fish capture in 
coastal central and 40 per cent of the fish capture in coastal southeast and 
southwest are used for domestic consumption (MARD, 2011).  
As in other parts of the world, Vietnam fisheries is also experiencing rapid decline as 
a consequence of overexploitation. Between 1990 and 2013 the marine catch 
increased about 4.5 times from 653,000 to more than 2.6 million tonnes: that was 
much higher than maximum sustainable yield in fisheries (GSO 2013) . The coastal 
catch showed a growth annually due to the increase in number of small fishing boats 
(FAO 2010). In addition, failure in control of net mesh sizes of has been a cause of 
fisheries degradation because undersized mesh was used, increasing the level of 
by-catch of juvenile fish (Dao & Thuoc 2003). In addition, the use of destructive 
fishing techniques such as push net, stow net, trawls, explosives, electricity and 
poison have caused damage to fish habitats (Nguyen 2003). The overexploitation of 
fisheries eventually reduced fishers’ incomes, thus fishers had to increase fishing 
capacity by either increasing number of fishing gears or changing fishing techniques. 
Marine fisheries, especially coastal fisheries in Vietnam are complicated to manage 
for several reasons. Firstly, coastal fisheries are classified as small scale fisheries 
(Pomeroy et al. 2009) with a huge numbers of fishing boats (73,000) and a large 
number of fishers (about 500,000 full time fishers) involved. However, a majority of 
the fishing fleet (72%) have capacity of 45 horsepower or less. In addition most of 
the fishing boats operate in inshore areas up to 8-9 km from the coast (MARD 2013). 
Secondly, there are conflicts between fishers (Pomeroy et al. 2007). The increasing 
number of resource users and the heavy reliance of fishers on fish for food and 
income has led to high competition in accessing fishing grounds. Thirdly, the state 
fisheries management system in Vietnam does not have enough staff to deal with 
fisheries problems at community level. Thirdly, although the Vietnamese government 
has decentralized fisheries management to lower levels since the 1990s, the 
 11 
 
government-based management system cannot deal with fisheries problems at 
community level. The government system does not have enough staff to handle 
conflict between fishers, to monitor fishing activities such as fishing registration 
(Tuan 2009; Ho et al. 2011). 
To deal with the fisheries problems, the government of Vietnam realized that getting 
fishers involved in fisheries management is essential for sustainable fisheries 
resources. Accordingly, the role of fishers in fisheries management was mentioned in 
fisheries law in 2003 and its relevant decrees. In addition, in 2000 the Ministry of 
Interior issued a decision on formulation of Vietnam Fisheries Associations, that led 
to the formation of Fisheries Associations in coastal provinces and villages in 
Vietnam during the following 10 years. These documents and decisions provided 
legal foundations for development of fisheries co-management in Vietnam. As a 
result from 2006-2007 the first “co-management pilot models” were arranged in 
some parts of Vietnam through cooperation projects or donor-funded projects (Lai 
2008) and the first fisheries co-management arrangement in which power and 
responsibility are shared officially between government and fishers was formalised in 
2009, also through a donor-funded action research project. It has been nearly a 
decade since the first fisheries co-management model was set up in Vietnam, yet 
there is very little information about how the fisheries co-management system was 
built, how the system works and what the results of the system are.  
1.3 Research rationale  
Fisheries co-management has been widely studied. In general, literature on fisheries 
co-management focuses on two areas: theoretical perspectives; and practical 
perspectives. The former area involves conceptualization or summarisation of 
fisheries co-management framework, theories and trends (Berkes et al. 1991; 
Berkes 1994; Pinkerton 1994a; Jentoft et al. 1998; Hoggarth et al. 1999; Berkes et 
al. 2001; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004; Carlsson & Berkes 2005; Jentoft 2005; Berkes 
2007; Plummer & Fennell 2007; Berkes 2010b; Berkes 2010a), institutional 
arrangements (Pinkerton 1994a; Pinkerton 1994b; Nielsen & Vedsmand 1999; Noble 
2000; Berkes 2002; Nielsen et al. 2004; Jentoft 2005), participation of stakeholders, 
power, empowerment and devolution (Jentoft & McCay 1995; Pomeroy & Berkes 
1997; Kaplan & Kite-Powell 2000; Pomeroy 2001; Jentoft 2005; Larson & Soto 2008; 
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Berkes 2009), or factors affecting successful co-management (Hauck & Sowman 
2001; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2007; Allahyari 2009; Pomeroy 
et al. 2011). The latter area focuses on co-management practices in world fisheries. 
These include consideration of fisheries co-management case studies in both 
developed and developing countries (Pinkerton 1989a; Wilson et al. 2003; Pomeroy 
& Ahmed 2006). These case studies present either the co-management 
arrangement, its implementation or outcomes.  
While the development of co-management systems in many developing countries, 
including Vietnam, involved support and or intervention by external agencies through 
donor funded projects, the influence of the external agencies on the sustainability of 
co-management systems has not been analysed sufficiently. Although the role of 
donors is recognised as important in starting fisheries co-management systems in 
Asian and Africa, how - and to what extent - the co-management system depends on 
the donors and the ways in which the donors have influenced the success of the 
system have not been investigated in depth.  
Although fisheries co-management case studies have been documented widely, 
most of the cases focus on only one stage of the co-management process (e.g. co-
management arrangement, or co-management implementation or co-management 
outcomes). As co-management is a context-based system (Armitage et al. 2007; 
Plummer & Armitage 2007), there is a relationship between the building, 
implementation and results of a co-management system. Therefore, a co-
management study that involves all three components of a co-management system 
in the same resource body will enable the cause and effect relationships between 
the components of the system to be revealed.  
Despite a large number of studies that have been carried out in fisheries co-
management in many places in the world, there is a dearth of co-management 
studies in Vietnam, where fisheries play a crucial role in food security, employment, 
livelihoods and national economics, but are threatened by overexploitation and 
depletion. Most of the research on fisheries co-management in Vietnam has only 
provided a brief introduction of co-management systems as a new approach for 
fisheries co-management and policies for co-management (Lai 2008; Pomeroy et al. 
2009; Truong et al. 2010; Armitage et al. 2011b) - there is no study on how the 
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fisheries system works and the insights into the system building, implementation and 
results.  
Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam is selected to conduct this research to fill these gaps in 
the literature. Tam Giang - the largest lagoon system in Southeast Asia – is located 
in Central Vietnam. It is tle largest brackish water body in South East Asia. It 
combines wild fish, aquaculture and sanctuaries, and provides livelihood and income 
for about 300,000 people. It is a complex social-ecological system with a diversity of 
lagoon uses, high density of fishing gear and complicated property rights (Huong & 
Berkes 2011). The ecological values and complexity of the lagoon have attracted 
many donor-funded projects aiming at protection and conservation of lagoon 
resources. Among these, some projects worked on fisheries co-management.  
1.4 Research aim and objectives 
The transformation in coastal resources governance has led to the formation of a co-
management system in Tam Giang Lagoon - one of the first places in Vietnam where 
a formal co-management arrangement was made between fishers and government. 
It is therefore important to study how the co-management arrangements were 
developed to provide practical guidelines for development of co-management 
elsewhere, and at the same time to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each 
arrangement. Moreover, as co-management is a new approach to this area it is 
important to explore how this innovation is perceived by resource users, government 
and other stakeholders and to see if co-management really works and brings any 
benefits to the environment and resource users. 
This research investigates fisheries co-management in Vietnam using the case of 
Tam Giang Lagoon. It analyses the role of donors and leadership in co-
management, power sharing and outcomes of co-management.  
1.4.1  Aims 
The overall aims of this research are (i) to contribute to understanding about how co-
management works in a developing country and (ii) to contribute towards building 
successful fisheries co-management.  
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1.4.2 Objectives and research questions 
This research had three objectives which focused on three main stages of the co-
management process: building, implementation and outcomes.  
Objective 1: To investigate how co-management was initiated and arranged in Tam 
Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. 
Research questions:  
1. How was co-management introduced to Tam Giang Lagoon? 
2. What was the co-management organized?  
3. What are the shortcomings of the co-management system and how can it be 
improved?  
Objective 2: To analyse the factors affecting the co-management system in Tam 
Giang Lagoon. 
Research questions:  
1. What was the role of donor funded projects in building co-management in 
Tam Giang Lagoon, and in what ways have these donors influenced the 
sustainability of the co-management system? 
2. What kinds of power have been shared between fishers and government, and 
what factors affect fishers’ exercise of the shared power?  
3. How do the leaders of fishing communities influence successful co-
management?  
Objective 3: To analyse the outcomes of the fisheries co-management system in 
Tam Giang Lagoon. 
Research questions:  
1. Have there been any social and ecological changes in Tam Giang Lagoon 
since the co-management system has been in operation? What are they? 
2. How were these changes associated with the presence of the fisheries co-
management system?  
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3. What are the factors affecting the outcomes of the fisheries co-management 
system?  
4. What are the implications for improving the outcomes of the co-management 
system?  
1.5 Study area: Tam Giang Lagoon  
The Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon system (well known as Tam Giang Lagoon) is 
located along 80 km of coastline in Thua Thien Hue Province, Central Vietnam 
(Figure 0-1). 
 
Figure 0-1: Tam Giang – Cau Hai Lagoon system, Vietnam (Armitage et al. 2011) 
Tam Giang Lagoon is the largest lagoon in Southeast Asia with an area of 22,000 
ha. It receives water from four rivers, of which three main rivers namely Huong, Bo 
and O Lau shape the name of the lagoon (Tam Giang means three rivers in Sino - 
Vietnamese language). It is connected to the sea via two estuaries: Thuan An 
estuary and Tu Hien estuary. The lagoon system is separated from the sea by a 
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large sand dune system. Tam Giang Lagoon system comprises a series of coastal 
lagoons including Tam Giang Lagoon, Sam Chuon Lagoon, Ha Trung-Thuy Tu 
Lagoon, and Cau Hai Lagoon. 
Tam Giang Lagoon is a semi-closed lagoon. The interface area between salt water 
and fresh water causes changes in its salinity both temporally and spatially. There is 
a significant difference in salinity in different area of the lagoons and time in the year, 
ranging from 0.2 to 34‰ (Thung 2007). The salinity and ecological characteristics of 
this brackish water system are favourable for the development of aquaculture in 
most parts of the lagoons (Ton & Le 2002). 
Tam Giang Lagoon is classified as Type J, “Coastal brackish/saline lagoons; 
brackish to saline lagoons with at least one relatively narrow connection to the sea”, 
in the Ramsar Convention classification of 1996 (RCW 1996). Thanh et al. (1998) 
categorized the wetland habitats in Tam Giang Lagoon into eight types: swamp with 
rice farm, swamp with mangrove, tidal flat, aquatic grass bed, muddy bottom, sandy 
mud bottom, and aquaculture ponds. Thung (2007) identified six sub-ecosystems in 
Tam Giang Lagoon: i) The river estuarine sub-ecosystem; ii) Sub-ecosystem of 
water grass that occupies 50 per cent of the lagoon area and plays an important role 
in food chains in the lagoon system; iii) Sub-ecosystem of soft bottom; iv) Tidal sub-
ecosystem; v) Agricultural sub-ecosystem; and vi) Mangrove sub-ecosystem. A 
comparison between 1998 and 2007 shows that there was a decline in the area of 
mangrove and rice fields while the area of aquaculture ponds increased eight times 
in the Tam Giang area (Thung 2007). 
Bio-ecological values of the Tam Giang Lagoon system have been recognized in 
literature. This complex lagoon system plays an important role in climate 
conditioning, preventing salinization, and controlling floods (Thanh & Hoi 1994). It is 
also highly appreciated for its biodiversity and resource richness. The lagoon is an 
important migratory habitat for 34 out of 73 waterfowl species recorded in Vietnam 
(Thanh et al. 1998). The lagoon is also home to many aquatic species; It is 
estimated that there are about 1,000 species living in the Tam Giang Lagoon 
system. Of these 947 species have been named (Thung 2007), 30 species are 
named in the red list of threatened species and need to be protected and one 
species is listed in the Vietnamese Red Book of endangered species (Thanh et al. 
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2005). The species in Tam Giang Lagoon are classified into seven groups including 
sea grass, sea weed and other water plants, phytoplankton, zooplankton, benthos, 
fish and bird (Thung 2007). There are about 235-250 species of fish including many 
with high economic values (Thung 2007). It was estimated that every year Tam 
Giang Lagoon provides about 2,000 tonnes of seaweeds including 400 tonnes of 
Gracilaria tenuispitata (for making agar), 20-30 tonnes of crab, 1,000 tonnes prawn 
and more than 1,000 tonnes of fish with high economic value (Thanh et al. 2005; 
Thung 2007).  
The lagoon is an important nursery area for inshore and offshore fish species (Thanh 
& Hoi 1994). For this value, Tam Giang Lagoon is proposed to become one of the 16 
highest priority marine protected areas in Vietnam (Hoi et al. 1998; ADB 1999b). In 
1997, the Department of Science, Technology and Environment Department of Thua 
Thien Hue Province - where Tam Giang Lagoon is located - proposed to establish a 
national wetland protected area at Tam Giang-Cau Hai (Thanh et al. 1997) with a 
total area of 4,189 ha, comprising a core zone of 1,286 ha and a buffer zone of 2,921 
ha. Most recently, Thua Thien Hue Province authority has approved a proposal for 
establishing eight fishery protected areas in Tam Giang Lagoon with a total area of 
more than 20 ha to protect habitats for aquatic species, breeding grounds and 
recover the ecological system in Tam Giang Lagoon.  
Tam Giang Lagoon involves five districts in Thua Thien Hue Province with 33 
communes and 155 villages. It is home to about 300,000 people, accounting for one 
third of Thua Thien Hue Province. Of these, 100,000 people depend directly on the 
lagoon resources and approximately 200,000 people earn their living from agriculture 
and/or part time or seasonal capture fisheries and aquaculture. Among 155 villages 
in Tam Giang Lagoon, 50 per cent are fishing villages where most of the villagers 
earn their living directly from lagoon resources. In the fishing villages, about 90 per 
cent of the households are engaged in fisheries-related industries and a majority of 
the households (46%) depend totally on capture fisheries and/or aquaculture (Ho et 
al. 2011). Recently there has been a transition in livelihoods in the lagoon 
households with the younger generation in Tam Giang Lagoon trying to find a job 
outside of fisheries and agriculture industries (Ho et al. 2011). 
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The poverty incidence in Tam Giang Lagoon area is higher than that of the provincial 
and rural national poverty rates (Ho et al. 2011). Among Tam Giang communities, 
traditional fishing households are the poorest. In the Tam Giang area, there are 
about 1,500 traditional fishing households with about 10,000 people (they are called 
sampan people) (Hong & Thong 2000). Sampan people used to live on boats but 
have been resettled recently. Though sampan people have been resettled they are a 
marginalized and vulnerable group with no land, low income and heavy dependence 
on capture fisheries for food and livelihoods.  
1.6 Thesis structure: 
This thesis consists of introductory, literature review, methods and closing chapters, 
and a set of four published and one unpublished papers which report the findings of 
the study. Following this introduction chapter are the literature review (chapter 2) and 
methodology (chapter 3) chapters. The following five chapters present the research 
findings in journal paper format. Chapter 4 describes the emergence and evolution of 
fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon. The role of donors in development 
of fisheries co-management is analysed in chapter 5, which was published in Ocean 
and Coastal Management. Chapter 6 presents the findings on power sharing in co-
management, published in Marine Policy. Chapter 7, accepted for publication by 
Society and Natural Resources, presents the analysis of the influence of leadership 
on co-management. The outcomes of co-management are shown in chapter 8,  
published in Fisheries Research. Chapter 9 presents discussion and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
Plate 2: Fishers are installing a conservation sign in a fisheries protected area  
in Tam Giang Lagoon 
(Photo: Thua Thien Hue Department of Fisheries Resource Exploitation and 
Protection) 
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The literature specific to each paper is presented in those papers. This chapter 
provides a general review of literature as theoretical foundation for this study.  
2.1 Co-management arrangements  
Co-management arrangements are diverse in terms of parties involved, differences in 
formality or legality of arrangements or agreements, different scales of co-
management, differences in institutional arrangements for co-management, 
differences in species to be managed, and differences in functions taken by resources 
users (Pinkerton 1989a). 
There is no fixed process for development of co-management arrangements because 
co-management is a context-based process (Armitage et al. 2007). However, there 
are certain elements that form a framework for co-management arrangements in any 
place. According to (Pomeroy 2006) these elements include: 
i. Incentive for co-management  
ii. Initiating co-management 
iii. Stakeholders and representation in co-management  
iv. Management units (scale) and cross-scale linkages of co-management  
v. Degree of co-management 
vi. Form of co-management agreement. 
2.1.1 Incentives for co-management  
Pomeroy and Berkes (1997, p.476) claim that “Co-management does not come 
about automatically but requires some impetus.  Most  commonly, it  is  the  
recognition  of a  resource management  problem  that  triggers  co-management”. 
Co-management agreements between governments and resource users are created 
in response to that fact that neither the government nor community can resolve 
resource problems alone. This has been the case in fisheries management in Asia 
where the governments are not capable to deal with the rapid degradation of 
resources, and this has led to advocacy for community-based resource 
management. However community-based management systems cannot succeed in 
isolation because it lacks legal support due to weak connection with government 
(Pomeroy 2003b). As a result, fisheries management is moving toward co-
management in this area (Pomeroy 2003b).  
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The adoption of co-management is driven by different factors. The most common 
has been the failure of government in effective management of resources, leading to 
resource depletion (Jackson et al. 1998; Hara et al. 2002). In some cases co-
management is developed as a tool to control fishing capacity (Machena & 
Kwaramba 1995; Hachongela et al. 1998) or a tool for conflict resolution 
(Hachongela et al. 1998; Sowman et al. 1998; Kearney 2002).  
Co-management is widely supported because it can address different concerns in 
natural resources management. In the context of resource depletion, the conflict 
among resource user groups is getting worse (Pomeroy et al. 2007) and government 
fails to manage natural resources at local level. The emergence of co-management 
is expected to result in more appropriate, efficient and equitable management 
(Pinkerton 1989b). A study in Africa conducted by Sowman et al. (1998) shows that 
in most cases co-management was arranged to respond to the over-exploitation of 
resources as a consequence of government’s failure to effectively manage natural 
resources, especially common pool resources such as fisheries. Pinkerton (1989b) 
and Hachongela et al. (1998) claim that co-management has been promoted as a 
tool for conflict resolution among various stakeholders. These authors find that 
through co-management arrangements resource users and government have more 
opportunities to communicate with each other and have open dialogue for conflict 
resolution. As a result, co-management can rectify gaps in the current management 
systems where the role of civil society is not often appreciated (Jentoft & McCay 
2003).  In addition, local people also are involved in enforcement and development 
of policies and plans for resource management. This benefits them as well as the 
resources. Looking at economic aspects, literature also shows that co-management 
offers a lower transaction cost than other management regimes (e.g. centralized 
management) (Hanna 2003; Kuperan et al. 2008). In co-management approaches 
the costs of monitoring and enforcement are lower (Kuperan et al. 2008). Pomeroy 
(2003a) asserts that co-management offers a way of improving legitimacy under 
which regulations and rules are complied with.   
In summary according to Carlsson & Berkes (2005), the benefits of co-management 
are: 
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 Co-management is thought to be good for allocation of tasks because it 
gathers a variety of capacities from different actors, allows specialized 
divisions of labour, and increases efficiency.  
 The partnership and cooperation in co-management allows for exchange of 
resources between community and state.   
 Co-management mechanisms promote the coordination of the activities of 
representatives from different levels and organizations.  
 Co-management is believed to help reduce risk in resource management 
because the management tasks have been shared among a number of 
actors.  
 Co-management is most appreciated for its function in conflict resolution 
between resource users and government, and among resource users.  
 Co-management reduces the transaction cost for conflict resolution.  
The particular incentives for resource users and government to cooperate vary. In 
management of protected areas, co-management has emerged to resolve conflict 
between government and Indigenous people related to the exclusion of Indigenous 
people, the original owners of the land, from planning and management of protected 
areas for conservation (Lane 2001). In this context, a co-management regime that 
promotes participatory planning approaches was arranged in order to resolve the 
conflict and reduce social and cultural consequences of conservation (Rao & Geisler 
1990).  
In the case studies in fisheries co-management in Asia, the strong motivation for 
fishers to work with government and other partners has been the depletion of 
resources.  In Asia while most fishers’ livelihoods rely heavily on the natural 
resources, by joining co-management fishers expected an improvement on resource 
health that would contribute to social-economic improvements (Nikijuluw 1996; Katon 
et al. 1997; Katon et al. 1998; Khan & Apu. 1998; Masae & Boromtanarat 1998; 
Thompson et al. 1998; van Mulekom & Tria 1999). In others cases, people 
participated in co-management to enforce the rules and improve legitimacy for better 
use of resources and conflict resolutions (Katon et al. 1997; Baticados & Agbayani 
1998; Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom & Tria 1999). In these cases, the elimination 
of illegal and destructive fishing activities and equal access to and use of resources 
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have been the motivations for fishers to manage jointly with government. In some 
cases the direct benefits from participating in co-management activities have 
motivated fishers to co-operate with government. For example by co-managing local 
people could improve their livelihood through ecotourism activities (Nikijuluw 1996) 
or make extra earnings by joining resource protection activities (Pham & Phung 
1999). In some cases the benefits provided by donor-funded programmes (e.g. cash, 
materials, capacity building) have been incentives for the fishers to participate in co-
management programmes / activities (Hara et al. 2002; Hara & Nielsen 2003). 
Governments have turned to co-management as a means of responding to a 
management crisis (Pomeroy & Berkes 1997). Many governments in Asia come to 
co-management of fisheries resources with local people mainly to seek sustainable 
coastal resource management that they were not able to handle by themselves 
(Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom & Tria 1998). In some cases co-management was 
set up as a government action for promoting democracy at grass roots level (Khan & 
Apu. 1998). Sometimes, government considered co-management as a management 
opportunity, as in the case of resource rehabilitation projects and some land claims 
agreements (Pomeroy & Berkes 1997). 
2.1.2 Initiating Co-management  
Co-management initiators in this research refer to those who start the idea of co-
management and / or introduce co-management concepts into practice.  In some 
countries the idea of co-management comes from the desire of government and 
resource users who want to collaborate with each other for resource development 
and conflict resolution (Rusnak 1997). In these cases the co-management was built 
by and for the government and local people without any support or advice of any 
external agents. These have been the cases in Canada and Australia where a large 
area of land / resources historically belong to Native people (e.g. Aboriginal people in 
Australia or Indian and Inuit in Canada). In the case of James Bay and Northern 
Quebec in Canada, for example, the exclusion of Native People from resource 
decision-making processes to which their rights have been recognized in legal 
documents led to conflict between Native People and government. In this context the 
co-management was arranged through formal agreements as desired by both 
government and Native People for better development of resources and to recognize 
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the legal certainty of Aboriginal titles on land claim to avoid court challenges   
(Berkes 1989; Doubleday 1989). A similar context and situation happened in 
Australia where Aboriginal people were excluded from management and use of 
protected areas which were considered as limited-access areas (Ross et al. 2009). 
While, by custom (and later by formal granting of land rights and native title), 
Aboriginal People owns these areas, government’s recognizing Aboriginals as only 
potential managers or residents of protected areas resulted in conflicts and 
unsustainable development of the protected areas. To solve these problems the co-
management between government and Traditional Owners has been built through 
formal agreements. Co-management recognises statutory rights, and constitutional 
rights of Aboriginals in practical ways (Ross et al. 1994; Craig 2002). 
By contrast, the development of co-management in some developing countries in 
Asia and Africa often involved external support or advice. The ideas of building co-
management were in some cases initiated by government and resource users and in 
other cases by external agents. Pomeroy (2006) classifies the promotion of co-
management as external beginnings and internal beginnings. A co-management 
arrangement initiated externally to the community is one in which the ideas for co-
management originated with an external agent (Hara et al. 2002; Aleroza et al. 2003; 
Harris et al. 2003; Pomeroy & Goetze. 2003). In the developing countries where co-
management is initiated through donor-funded projects, co-management 
arrangements normally have external beginnings. In some cases, co-management is 
identified as a useful intervention approach by a large donor-assisted or a 
component of a large development or research programmes (Hauck & Sowman 
2001; Hara & Nielsen 2003; Pomeroy 2006). There is another situation where 
government has defined a specific protected area and wants to set up co-
management to protect that area (Pomeroy 2006). Meanwhile co-management 
arrangements initiated internally, i.e. within the community, begin from the resource 
users who are experiencing problems of resource degradation and conflict in 
resource use. For this resource users need advice and support from government 
officials and/or external agents to solve problems (Katon et al. 1999; Galit 2001). A 
co-management arrangement can also start where both government and resource 
users realize conflict in resource use and/or resource degradation and they 
cooperate with each other for resource protection and management through an 
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agreement (Landmann 1988; Berkes 1989; Cohen 1989; Nursey-Bray & Rist 2009; 
Ross et al. 2009).  
The approach to beginning co-management influences the sustainability of co-
management arrangements. The external beginnings are considered as a “top-
down” approach to building co-management and in some cases this leads to a lack 
of sustainability. This “top-down” approach limits the participation of community in 
early phases of the co-management process and community involvement in the co-
management process as a partner to implement the co-management ideas which 
are designed by external agents (Pomeroy 2006). The introduction of co-
management arrangements through donor funded projects may not be secure 
because of the discontinuation of co-management after the donor’s termination, and 
/ or inflexibility of co-managements arrangements due to donor’s requirements and 
demands (Hara & Nielsen 2003). The co-management arrangements driven by 
external agents also result in the lack of “buy-in-into the idea of co-management by 
government” and thus community is not considered as an equal partner in co-
management by government (Hauck & Sowman 2001).  In contrast to the external 
beginnings, with internal beginnings, the ideas of co-management driven by resource 
users are more promising in terms of sustainability because resource users 
themselves “have recognized a problem, they have an incentive to take action, and 
they take the lead to finding a solution” (Pomeroy 2006).  
2.1.3 Stakeholders and representation in co-management 
2.1.3.1 Stakeholder  
Stakeholders in co-management are individuals, groups or organizations of people 
who are interested, involved or affected (positively or negatively) by resource use 
and management. 
The definitions of co-management imply that actors who are involved in different co-
management arrangements may not be the same. The early definitions of co-
management during the 1980s and early 1990s  only emphasise the involvement of 
two primary stakeholders – government and local community / local resource users  - 
in co-management (McCay & Acheson 1987; Berkes et al. 1991). In the late 1990s 
and 2000s the definitions of co-management also mention the involvement of other 
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stakeholders in addition to government and community in co-management (IUCN 
1996; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000; Jentoft 2003; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).  
In some cases co-management arrangements were primarily developed by 
government and different groups of resource users (Berkes 1989; Cohen 1989; 
Craig 1999; Craig 2002; Ross et al. 2009). However, in many circumstances, the 
development of co-management involved other stakeholders rather than resource 
users and government. The external stakeholder include scientists (Arnold & 
Fernandez-Gimenez 2007), NGOs or donor- funded projects (Hara & Nielsen 2003; 
Pomeroy & Ahmed 2006).  
Obviously stakeholders in co-management are different from place to place. 
Unfortunately there is very little literature on stakeholder analysis in co-management 
arrangements. Therefore the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder in co-
management arrangements are not documented adequately.  
Based on the experiences gained from ten years working in fisheries co-
management in developing countries in Asia and Africa, Pomeroy (2006) argues that  
there are four groups of stakeholders involved in building co-management: i) 
resources users community, ii) government, iii) other stakeholders (in direct resource 
users, business people, community-based groups) and iv) change agents. However, 
the roles of government and local people identified by Pomeroy did not reflect the 
partnership feature that is essential for co-management. Pomeroy failed to show how 
government and local people’s roles ensure the partnership and the “power sharing” 
happen. In particular, local people’s roles as defined by Pomeroy in co-management 
do not make them a partner in co-management, but a stakeholder in a community-
based resource management system that is consulted by government. This is 
because Pomeroy’s co-management concept is very close to the Community Based 
Resource Management (CBRM) concept that is called “Community-based Co-
management”. In addition, Pomeroy also confuses between the roles of government 
as a partner in co-management and as a regulator. He places much emphasis on 
administrative roles of the government in co-management.  
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2.1.3.2 Representation in co-management 
A proper balance of representation among stakeholders is crucial for success of co-
management. A central question, however, is which stakeholders should be 
represented and involved and how the representatives should be chosen. 
According to  Dahl (1989) those who are affected by decisions should be heard. 
However this principle can not apply fully in resource management where there is a 
huge number of stakeholders, for instance in fishery co-management the number of 
stakeholders is nearly 20 (Mikalsen & Jentoft 2001). Therefore, selection of 
stakeholders to participate in co-management arrangements is needed. According to 
Jentoft et al. (2003) the importance of stakeholders in co-management can be 
scored according to three attributes: Legitimacy, power and urgency. Legitimacy 
refers to legal, moral or presumed claim on management systems. Power refers to 
the level of influence on management decisions. Urgency refers to the demands that 
need to be satisfied by management systems. However, using these attributes is not 
without dangers. Some stakeholders may have a high score in power and urgency 
but low score in legitimacy. Such stakeholders may easily obtain a status in the 
management system but they may be not accepted from an equity and fairness point 
of view.  
Under each stakeholder representation can come from three forms or categories: 
functional, territorial and virtual (Jentoft et al. 2003).  Functional representatives 
come from a group with the same interests (users of the same fishing 
gear/technology). Territorial representatives are expected to speak for a specific 
geographical area such as their community. Virtual representation refers to the 
representatives who cannot or do not make decisions.  
In co-management, the selected representatives will form a so called “co-
management organization” with different names in different places. It is a 
management council / board in Western countries (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; 
Ross et al. 2009) or a committee in  developing countries (Hara & Nielsen 2003; 
Pomeroy 2003b). In developing countries, at local level, the community’s 
representatives are selected by community members using democratic principles of 
election. 
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As representatives “stand for” others, personal values and capacity of 
representatives are very important. The representatives should be trusted by their 
community (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000). The trust can be obtained through 
personal capacity, knowledge, reputation and prestige.  In situations where the 
community is heterogeneous in terms culture, interest, values and norms, the 
community’s representative should have strong management and headship skills 
(Pomeroy 2006).  The representative should also have knowledge and technical 
expertise on the management areas. More important, they should have rhetorical 
skills that are essential for effective communication and arguments (Jentoft et al. 
2003). 
2.1.4 Management units and cross-scale linkages  
2.1.4.1 Management units  
Management unit refers to the “scale” of co-management arrangements. “Scale” in 
this research is defined as the spatial, quantitative or jurisdictional dimensions used 
to study how and to what level co-management is arranged. The scale of co-
management varies from place to place but it is defined by the physical size of the 
area to be managed and numbers of members involved in management of an area 
(Pomeroy et al. 2001). A management unit can be small or large but it should have 
clear boundaries, make ecological sense (e.g. allowing coherent planning and 
implementation of needed imitative, economic sense (e.g. equality in sharing 
responsibilities among beneficiaries of co-management initiatives), and social sense 
(e.g. geographical conditions of groups, group  homogeneity, )  (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2004). The definition of management unit implies a complexity of social-
ecological interaction of a management unit that can make a management unit very 
large if it addresses all social, ecological and economic issues. In practice a 
management unit cannot cope with all ecological, economic and social requirements.  
There are different ways to identify a management unit. A management unit can start 
from a defined geophysical boundary (Viner et al. 2006). In this case, the boundaries 
of the area to be managed are often established based on an administrative 
management boundary (e.g. village, commune, district…) but where possible, 
ecological issues are also considered (Pomeroy et al. 2001) and the co-management 
is arranged between government and recourse users in that area. In some cases, 
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the management unit is defined based on a set of resources, e.g. a protected area or 
an area of mangrove forests, and a community is selected to set up a co-
management arrangement with government to manage that resource (Pomeroy & 
Goetze. 2003; Ross et al. 2009). In other situations, the management unit can start 
from a recognized community and the resource area that they manage. This is the 
common approach in setting up co-management between government and 
Aboriginal people or tribes in Canada (Rusnak 1997; Weinstein 1998). Management 
units can be arranged as a nested system in which a series of sub management 
units are established under a broader management unit (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2000). A nested system is necessary where the resource systems, e.g. those on 
which fisheries rely, are too large to be entirely within control of a few communities 
and where problems and issues facing the resource can only be solved on a 
provincial, national or even international level. However, genuine and equal 
representation in a nested system should be given attention (Nielsen et al. 2004). 
The scale of management unit influences the result of the co-management. In 
general, the management unit should be large enough to accommodate an 
ecosystem or habitat, and small enough to accommodate a social unit in charge. 
According to Pomeroy (2001) co-management will work better under a fairly small 
management unit in terms of membership and jurisdiction. Therefore he suggests 
that in co-management where a large number of people are involved, it is better to 
divide them into small groups because small groups are more manageable than 
larger groups (Pomeroy 2006). Similarly, a management unit that covers a large 
geographical or ecological area will lead to ineffective co-management (EPA 1997) 
because there are too many individual problems in such a big area fort a 
management plan to address sufficiently. Large scale co-management results in 
unfocused and complicated plans that diffuse responsibility of actors (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004).  
2.1.4.2 Cross-scale linkages in co-management  
Cross–scale linkages refer to the interactions across different institutions, actors 
involved in management of a resource.   
Cross-scale linkages may involve horizontal institutions (across space) and vertical 
institutions (across levels of organization). Horizontal cross-scale interactions occur 
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among resource users, for example between aquaculture and fishermen using the 
same lagoon, or between different management units involved in a certain resource 
area (e.g. lagoon) or between different departments at the same levels. This 
interaction creates a network or an alliance of resource users (Wilson et al. 2006).  
Vertical cross-scale interactions occur between the government and the local 
community, e.g. between Federal government, provincial and territorial governments 
and local community, or between government, NGO and local community (Berkes 
2002).  
Some literature asserts that resources cannot be managed effectively at a single 
scale, but rather must be managed at multiple scales (Berkes 2002; Wilson et al. 
2006). Therefore, cross-scale linkages are very important for sustainable and 
effective management of resources, especially for management of common pool 
resources where exclusion is difficult (Wilson et al. 2006). According to Berkes 
(2006) it is impossible for a resource management system to survive without having 
some cross-scale linkages.   
Cross-scale linkages are essential for effective management of resources for many 
reasons.  According to Lebel et al. (2005) the cross-scale interactions allow actors to 
share knowledge, experience and information to enable them to organise 
themselves to deal with certain challenges or problems. Cross-scale communication 
between government and local communities helps to build consensus for both 
government and community in management of a resource (Berkes & Seixas 2005). 
Cross-scale links are essential where the capacity of governing institutions at 
different levels is weak (Barrett et al. 2001) and the linkages among institutions is 
needed to enhance the capacity of the institutions. Even when local institutions are 
relatively strong, they cannot enforce sustainable natural resource management on 
their own because they are embedded within larger government institutions and legal 
and policy environments (Berkes & Seixas 2005). The interactions among resource 
users are especially important in the situation where external agents and 
government can only deal with specific issues in resource management while 
resource users have many problems to deal with. In this case cross-scale linkages or 
networking among resource users help them resolve their problems (Wilson et al. 
2006). Cross-scale linkages emerge based on the fact that any institution has its own 
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strengths and weaknesses, the interaction will help to combine strengths of different 
institutions and mitigate the weakness of each (Pomeroy & Berkes 1997).  
2.1.5 Degrees of co-management between government and resource users 
Co-management can take on a large variety of degrees, shapes and forms that need 
to be tailored to fit the unique needs and opportunities of each context. According to 
Carlsson & Berkes (2005) there are four alternatives for co-management 
arrangements under which co-management is considered i) as an information 
exchange system between separate spheres (state and community); ii) as a joint 
organization that is the intercepting part of the spheres, iii) as state-nested system 
under which state holds power and shares management functions, entitlements and 
responsibilities among resource users and iv) as a community-nested system where 
resources are owned privately and government is involved in the management 
process as a partner. These forms of co-management are illustrated in figure 2-1, 
where “S” stand for “state” and “C” stand for “community”. 
Form (i)       S                     C  
 
Form (ii)               S                   C     
 
Form (iii)                    S                C            
    
Form (iv)     C                S 
 
Figure 2-1: Four images of co-management (Carlsson & Berkes 2005) 
The co-management between government and community can be arranged as 
“complete” and “incomplete” degrees depending on the extent to which the 
management functions are performed jointly (Pinkerton 1989b).  A co-management 
system is considered as complete if all management functions are performed jointly 
between government and community. If the sharing of management functions 
between government and community is not carried out fully, the co-management is 
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seen as incomplete. Pinkerton (1989b) suggests seven management functions 
based on which a co-management system is considered as complete or incomplete. 
These functions are: i) Data gathering and analysis; ii) logical harvesting decision; iii) 
harvest allocation decisions; iv) protection for health of resources; v) enforcement of 
regulation or practices; vi) enhancement and long-term planning; and vii) broad 
policy decision-making. 
Co-management can also be performed to different degrees depending on the roles 
of government and resource users in decision making and the degree of power 
sharing between government and resource users. (Berkes 1994) categorized the co-
management between government and resource users into seven degrees in a 
hierarchy of co-management arrangements. The lowest level in the hierarchy is 
“informing” level, where community is a passive actor in co-management and is 
informed what government has decided to do, to a level where power is delegated to 
community (Berkes 1994). Based on Berkes’ categories, Sen  & Nielsen (1996) 
simplify co-management arrangements into five broad types namely instructive, 
consultative, cooperative, advisory and informative. The simplest categorization of 
the partnership degree in co-management is made by McConney et al. (2003) who 
classify the collaboration between government and community in resource 
management into three levels including consultative, cooperative and delegated.  
However, there are some arguments around these categorizations of co-
management. Wilson et al. (2003) argue that “all form of user participation do not 
qualify as co-management”. He perceives the “co” in co-management as 
collaborative management, not consultative management. Therefore, in his opinion, 
consultation is not considered as one level of co-management. This perception is 
further supported by other authors such as Hara & Nielsen (2003) and Pinkerton 
(2003) who emphasise the power sharing and equal partnership between 
government and community in co-management. These arguments imply that co-
management is misnamed if it is arranged as cooperative to informative partnership 
according to Sen & Nielsen (1996)’s categories.  
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2.1.6 Form of co-management agreement  
Co-management between government and community can be made through formal 
or informal agreements. In other words, there are customary or non-notarised 
agreements and formal legal agreements. According to Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
(2004), the agreements can be organized in the following forms:  
 ad hoc and non-legalized;  
 written bylaws or customary rules; 
 management plans for a body of natural resources;  
 legislative protection and regulation of sustainable use rights as framework 
within which to develop natural resource management plans; 
 agreed provision such as memorandum of understanding;  
 agreed settlements of natural resource  conflict among various parties, from 
government to resource users; 
 legal contracts between two or more parties regulating the costs and benefits 
of natural resource use; 
 project-based agreements between donors and recipient communities and 
relevant authorities 
 conditional licenses issued by public sector agencies on resource extraction 
and management; 
 international treaties and conventions concerning biodiversity and 
environmental issues (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). 
Informal agreements, such as norms (customary law and practice) and procedures 
(conflict management and dispute settlement) to govern natural resources, are often 
unique to a society and evolved through  generations of indigenous people (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004). Informal agreements can be unspoken agreement and / or 
customary agreements. Unspoken agreements embedded in local culture, history, 
social systems and cultural practices are based on people’s belief and religion where 
people perceive “nature” as a living part in the earth (Pomeroy & Pido 1995; Posey 
1999).  Customary agreements can be unwritten rules, customs, conventions and 
norms that are developed and agreed upon by resource users in a community or 
between communities (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).  Informal agreements often 
have low legitimacy with government and they are usually enforced through social 
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sanctions according to customary law, with decision-making in the hands of local 
institutions. The recognition of such agreements by governmental agencies can 
foster very effective co-management systems (Hauck & Sowman 2001; Pomeroy et 
al. 2001). 
In contrast to informal agreements, formal agreements have high legitimacy with 
government. While informal agreements are often used among indigenous 
communities and  fishing communities in Asia, formal agreements are the main form 
of co-management in developed countries such as Canada, USA and Australia 
(Pinkerton 1989a; Ross et al. 2005). The formal agreements can be arranged in 
different forms. In some cases, it comes up as a court-ordered agreement for a 
management plan between government and resource users (Cohen 1989). In others 
cases, formal agreements are the result of negotiation between government and 
community (Ross et al. 2009). Formal agreements can be built from several forums 
for joint problem solving under the shadow of the court (Dale 1989). Sometimes a 
formal agreement can be reached outside legal definition in which different 
stakeholders are willing to sit together for an agreement on allocation, use and 
management of resources (Jordan 1989). 
There is an interaction between the above elements of co-management. For 
example co-management incentives could have influence on the initiation of co-
management and the stakeholders of co-management. The scale of co-management 
may depend on type of stakeholder involved in co-management. In addition, there is 
a linkage between these elements of co-management arrangement   with other 
components of a co-management system. In particular, contextual conditions (e.g. 
social, economic and environmental) in which the resource system operates shape 
co-management arrangements and co-management outcomes.  In turn the 
outcomes of co-management will inform the needs to make any adjustment to the 
social, economic and environmental system and the elements of the co-management 
arrangements, in order to achieve better management. The interaction of these three 
components (contextual conditions, co-management arrangement and co-
management outcomes) are analysed in the frameworks for natural resource 
management in general and fishers co-management in particular.  
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2.2 Conceptual frameworks for studying fisheries co-management  
There are a number of research frameworks and alternative theories available for the 
study of fisheries co-management. (Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004) proposed a 
conceptual framework for co-management. This framework claimed that co-
management is “structured in terms of context, components and linking 
mechanisms”. (p876). The context of co-management is shaped by resource 
characteristics, claim of property rights and property right regimes. Within the 
context, three components, precondition, characteristics and outcomes, are 
consistent associated with co-management. Precondition components include 
participation, room for negotiation, incentive, legal support, leadership, networks and 
common vision. The characteristics component deal’s with communication and 
negotiation, transactive decision making, social learning and shared action. The 
outcomes component focuses on equity and efficiency in decision making, 
legalization of action and increased capacity. This framework also emphasizes the 
process of social interaction through linking the three components.   
Another framework was developed by (Plummer & Armitage 2007) for evaluating 
adaptive co-management, that links ecological, economic and social factors. This 
framework focuses on three main components: ecological system, livelihood 
outcomes and process and institutional conditions (e.g. social learning, 
communication and negotiation, transactive decision making). In this framework, the 
ecological component is a broader component in which the economic, then the 
process, components are nested. The interaction between the three components 
produces the outcomes including social-ecological resilience and sustainability.  
Ostrom (2010) offered a simple framework for institutional analysis that can be used 
for analysing co-management arrangements. Her framework consists of different 
factors or variables. It first identifies the exogenous variables such as biophysical 
condition and attributes of community. These variables then shape the action arena 
or social space in which the action situation and actors are analysed. The action 
arena influences the interaction between actors in the system. The outcomes of the 
system result from the other factors or variables in the framework, and in turn the 
outcomes have implications changes required in the system.  
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Another framework for institutional analysis was developed by ICLARM/IMF (1996). 
This framework has four interactive components: contextual variables, incentives to 
cooperate and coordinate, patterns of interactions among resource users, and 
outcomes. The first components involves an analysis of biological, technical, and 
physical attributes, attributes of the resource users, stakeholders, and community, 
resource user/ community institutional and organizational arrangements and external 
institutional and organizational arrangements. The second component focuses on 
analyzing the factors motivating the participation of stakeholders. Component three 
deals with the ways the stakeholders cooperate and interact with each other to 
produce outcomes. This framework also indicates a strong linkage between four 
components in which the first components shape the performance of the later ones, 
which in turn provide feedback to improve the first ones.  
In general all of the frameworks above present different variables that can be used 
for analysing co-management arrangements. These frameworks also show social, 
economic and ecological linkages between the variables that are essential for an 
evaluation of co-management. However, ICLARM/IMF (1996) was chosen as a 
conceptual research framework of this study for the following reasons.  Firstly, it is 
both specific enough in character for organizing inquiry but general enough to be 
useful in a variety of situations (e.g. six case studies). Secondly, it includes all 
attributes that this study requires. Thirdly, it synthesises key points from the literature 
well, covering important specific aspects of co-management arrangements. Finally 
this framework can be used to conduct a systematic and comparative analysis of 
diverse situations and identify relationships among variables for evaluative and 
diagnostic purposes.  As an evaluative tool, the framework can be used to analyse 
the outcomes of co-management. As a diagnostic tool the framework can be used to 
describe the problems of the system and prescribe solutions to improve the system. 
These are the main purposes of this research.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
Plate 3: A Focus group with the members of FA Executive Board 
(Photo: Duong Ngoc Phuoc 2012) 
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While methods are described in each paper, this chapter is provided to give an 
overview of the research design and explain the methods in more detail than was 
possible in publications.  
3.1 Conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework of this research was adapted from ICLARM/IFM (1996) 
(see chapter 2 for review). It is shown in Figure 3-1. The framework was adapted for 
this study by grouping the four components of the original framework into three 
components, aligned with the stages of co-management: building, implementation 
and outcomes. Some contextual variables in the original framework that are not 
relevant to this study (e.g. market, technical attributes) were omitted and the 
components 2 (incentives to cooperate) and 3 (pattern of interaction) expanded to 
highlight  specific variables (e.g. power, role of donors, leadership). Similarly the 
outcome component was adapted to show specific outcomes (social and ecological). 
This adapted framework allowed coverage of all topics of the research.    
Figure 3-1: Conceptual framework of the research  
Social-ecological context 
and the evolution of 
fisheries co-management 
Co-management 
initiators  
Co-management 
design  
Social 
outcomes  
Co-management 
building 
Co-management 
implementation 
Co-management 
outcomes 
Ecological 
outcomes  
Incentives 
(power) 
Community 
leadership  
External 
intervention 
(Donors) 
Research objective 2: To analyse the 
factors affecting the co-management 
system in Tam Giang Lagoon 
 
Research Objective 3: To 
analyse the outcomes of the 
fisheries co-management 
system in Tam Giang Lagoon 
 
Research objective 1: To investigate how co-
management was initiated and arranged in Tam 
Giang Lagoon 
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Within the stage of co-management building, I explored the evolution of fisheries co-
management within the social and ecological context of the research site, including 
the roles of the parties introducing co-management and the design (or evolution) of 
the co-management system. This addresses research objective 1. Under 
implementation, I analysed the factors affecting the success and sustainability of the 
co-management system. In particular, I analysed the impact of donor funded projects 
on the co-management system, how power sharing influences co-management 
implementation and the influence of the leaders of fisher’s organizations on co-
management implementation.  These analyses aim to achieve research objective 2. 
Research objective 3 is addressed in the last part of the framework. Looking at the 
outcome stage of co-management, I analysed social and ecological results 
potentially attributable to the presence of the co-management system. (Economic 
results are not addressed in this research due to data unavailability. See more 
explanation in chapter 7). This research framework also facilitated analysis of the 
mutual influences between the way co-management was built and how it was 
implemented, and between its design, implementation and results.   
3.2 Research methodology  
Figure 3-2 shows the methodologies used in this research. It is a case study 
approach, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
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Figure 3-2: Research methodology 
3.2.1 Case study approach  
The constructivist paradigm was used because the aim of this research is to explore 
and understand different aspects of co-management through the perceptions and 
experiences of different people, rather than explaining a hypothesized phenomenon 
(positivist) or creating social changes (critical theory). In accordance with this 
orientation, all comments, ideas and perceptions of informants were acknowledged 
and respected equally.  
This study uses a case study research approach using mixed methods research. 
This approach allows intensive description and analysis of single units or a bounded 
system (Smith 1978). Case study approach was used to describe the process of co-
management arrangements, to explore the factors affecting the co-management 
process and outcomes, to explain the causes behind co-management failure or 
success and to illustrate the outcomes of co-management (Yin 1994). The case 
study  method is chosen because it “offers a means of investigating complex units 
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consisting of multiple variables [e.g. Tam Giang Lagoon system] of potential 
importance in understanding of a phenomenon [e.g. fisheries co-management] 
(Merriam 1998). Using the case study method allowed the production of a rich, ‘thick’ 
and holistic picture of fisheries co-management arrangement. Further, the use of 
mixed methods within a case study approach allows choice of a set of methods, 
each with their own advantages and disadvantages, and triangulation.  
This research is designed as a single-case (embedded) design - type 2 in Yin 
(2009)’s basic types of design for case studies. In this design, Tam Giang Lagoon is 
defined as a single case study in which six embedded units were analysed. The 
embedded study unit is a fishing community, represented by its Fishery Association 
(FA) and its co-management arrangement. In each of the embedded cases, the 
components (co-management building, implementation and outcomes) were 
analysed so far as possible. A comparison between case studies and a 
generalization of the results were made. This means the data collected from each 
case were analysed separately, and a cross-case analysis was conducted 
presenting the case of Tam Giang Lagoon.  
In total there were 64 FAs in Tam Giang Lagoon at the time of this study (2014), and 
six FAs, accounting for about 10 per cent of total cases, were involved in this study. 
The embedded cases were selected based on the following criteria:  
1. Type of donor-funded projects involved in development of fisheries co-
management. The cases were selected to represent all types of donors 
including international and local NGOs, international organizations, 
International Development and Cooperation Agencies, and international 
research institutes. The cases selected also represented two type of projects: 
development projects and research projects.   
2. Location of case study: cases were chosen to cover the north, the centre and 
the south of the lagoon system, as there are considerable differences in the 
social, economic and ecological conditions between areas.    
3. Fishing activities and fishers’ livelihoods: Tam Giang Lagoon has a diversity of 
fishing gears (fish corrals, mobile bottom traps, gill nets), and fishing activities 
(fixed fishing and mobile fishing; motorized fishing and manual fishing). In 
addition, fishers earn their living from different activities, fishing or 
aquaculture. The case studies were chosen to cover different combinations of 
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livelihoods, either fishing or aquaculture or a combination of these, and the 
presence or otherwise of protected areas within their parts of the lagoon.  
4. Age of FA: According to Hauck and Sowman (2001) it takes more than three 
years for a co-management arrangement to form and start to achieve its 
outcomes. Therefore, the cases were selected to ensure the FAs had been 
established for at least three years by the time of data collection (2014). 
The selection of case studies also took into account other issues. i) The involvement 
of the resource users’ community in previous research, so as to avoid “research 
fatigue” in the community. ii) Size of FA. Many FAs have been established to 
collaborate with the government in co-management of Tam Giang Lagoon 
resources, some small in terms of number of members, and some large. As a survey 
was intended, with sufficient sample size in six case studies, FAs with more than 50 
members were chosen. iii) The background of FA leaders: the study cases were also 
selected to represent the diversity in background of FA leaders (e.g. in livelihoods, 
professional qualities, education).  
Based on these criteria, six case studies were selected (Table 3-3):  two cases in the 
north of the lagoon (case 1 and case 2), two cases in the central part (case 3 and 
case 4) and two cases in the south of the lagoon (case 5 and case 6). See Annex 1 
for detailed information on the case studies.  
Despite a well justified procedure for selection of case studies, the findings from the 
six embedded case studies may not reflect all aspects of fisheries co-management in 
the complex Tam Giang Lagoon system. Although about 11 per cent of the 
potentially eligible cases (six out of 50 FAs1) were selected for this research, 
according to a set of selection criteria designed to best represent the research 
region, the cases selected may not completely represent all aspects of the 64 cases 
due the complexity and diversity of the co-management arrangements in the lagoon.   
3.2.2 Data collection methods 
Two field trips were conducted to collect data. The first trip was carried out from 
October 2012 to January 2013 and the second from January to February 2014. All 
                                                          
1 Only the FAs that were established in or before 2009 were eligible for selection, to ensure that the 
FAs had been operating for at least three years at the time of data collection.  
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data were collected in the first trip, and verified, clarified and supplemented in the 
second trips.  
In this research, the combination of methods was to serve two main purposes. 
Firstly, it was used to triangulate the data by using different research methods in 
which the same research objects (people) share their opinions through survey or 
interviews (Gray 2009). Secondly, mixed methods design provided an opportunity to 
present the diversity of views on co-management arrangements (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori 2003). It allowed me to uncover new perspectives and contradictions 
among research groups. For example the quantitative results showed a positive 
impact of co-management and qualitative research provided insights on and 
explained the quantitative results.  
The sequence of data collection was as follows:  i) Secondary data was collected to 
have an overview about research topics, and research site. ii) Some informal 
interviews were conducted with the members of FA executive boards, resource 
manager’s fishers to reshape research methods, research objectives, and data 
collection tools. iii) About half of the focus group discussions and semi-structured 
interviews were carried out first to gain an overview of the research cases, to explore 
different angles of the research issues and to build more knowledge about the co-
management system in Tam Giang Lagoon. This information helped to improve the 
questionnaire for the survey. iv) Questionnaires were tested twice with a total of 10 
respondents to improve the survey questions. v) The survey, and the remainder of 
the focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were conducted 
concurrently; and vi) additional interviews, email, skype and telephone interviews 
were conducted to clarify and triangulate information.  
Data collection in each of the embedded case studies: In each case study, focus 
groups, interviews and a survey were conducted. Two focus group discussions were 
conducted with fishers, one with the members of the FA executive board and the 
other with ordinary fishers. In addition to the focus group discussions, two fishers 
were interviewed individually in each case. Interviewing individual fishers served two 
purposes. Firstly, these informants were interviewed to investigate in-depth and 
obtain further information to clarify any issue that was not completely explored in the 
focus group discussions. Secondly, the individual interviews with fishers helped to 
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understand particular cases, stories, or circumstances that had been raised in the 
discussions or observed by the research team. In each case study an interview with 
a staff member in charge of fisheries management at commune level was also 
conducted. A survey was carried out with fishers in each case study (see more 
details in Section 3.2.2.4). 
Data collection across the case studies: Individual interviews were conducted with 
resource managers, Provincial Fishery Association staff, co-management 
consultants and staff of NGOs and donor-funded projects, with respect to the entire 
co-management system (see more details in Section 3.2.2.3). 
3.2.2.1 Secondary data collection  
Secondary data were selected from documents of the Provincial Fishery Association, 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Fisheries section), and the 
Provincial statistics book. These sources provided background information about 
fishing communities, and status of fisheries and fisheries management, that were 
helpful in selecting the case studies and sampling for the survey.  
In addition, a dataset collected on three of the six case studies (case 2, case 3 and 
case 6) by a previous study (Armitage & Marschke 2013) was used to compare the 
change in fish catch, fish size, fish species diversity and conflict between resource 
users between two time periods (2006-2009 and 2009-2013). Though Armitage & 
Marschke’s survey and my survey were conducted in the same communities the 
individual respondents might not be the same. Further, as the surveys were 
designed and conducted by two different research groups, there was an 
inconsistency in categorization of data (e.g. Armitage & Marschke’s survey 
categorised 5 levels of fish catch changes, my survey had only three levels).    
Further details on this dataset are in chapter 8.  
3.2.2.2 Focus group discussions  
The number of participants in focus groups discussions in each case study is 
presented in Table 3-1. 
 45 
 
Table 3-1: Number of participants in focus group discussions 
Case study No of participants in 
group 1 (FA executive 
management board 
group)* 
No of participants in 
group 2 (Ordinary fisher 
group) 
1  6 8 
2  6 7 
3 6 8 
4 7 7 
5 6 7 
6 7 8 
(* In some cases, some former members of FA Executive Boards were also invited to the 
discussion, making the number of the participants in group 1 was bigger than the number of 
the members of FA Executive Board).  
In each case study, two focus groups discussions were organized: one with FA 
executive board members and the other with ordinary fishers. These focus groups 
were conducted separately to avoid the possibility of the FA management board 
members dominating the FA members in discussion, or their presence making 
ordinary members reluctant to talk. All members of the FA executive board were 
invited to their focus groups discussion, because the maximum number of the FA 
executive management board in any case study was eight. The participants in the 
other focus group discussion, who were ordinary fishers, were selected and invited 
by the chairmen of the FAs, according to the following criteria: age (young, middle 
age and old), poverty (poor and better off), livelihood (aquaculture and fishing), 
fishing activities (mobile fishing and fixed fishing) and geographical distribution.  
Each focus group discussion consisted of a small group of between six to eight 
participants. The interviews were limited to a small number of particular issues that 
were interesting or relevant to the groups and researcher (Berg 2009). Each focus 
group discussion lasted from 45 minutes to two and a half hours depending on the 
interest, passion and knowledge (about fisheries co-management) of the participants 
and the content of the discussion.  
Focus group discussions were moderated by me, and a field work assistant took 
notes of the discussions on paper (I also did some note taking during the 
discussion). I selected a fieldwork assistant who had experience and skills in group 
 46 
 
management and interviewing (Barbour 2008). He also had good observation skills 
to observe the nonverbal communication in the groups (Stewart et al. 2007). The 
group management skills of the moderators are important to make sure that the 
discussions were not dominated by some people, giving the other people in the 
group no chance to speak, and to ensure that the discussions stay on topic. A list of 
key questions was prepared prior to conducting the focus group discussions (Annexe 
2). As a discussion was developing more specific questions were asked to gain 
insight into the issues raised. For example in the prepared list of key questions, the 
questions about the donor were very general, for example “What is the role of the 
donors in development of co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon?”, but during the 
discussion, more detailed questions were asked about the influence of the donors. 
The participants were asked to share their experiences, opinions, perceptions and 
observations about building, implementation and results of co-management (see 
method section in chapters 3 to 7 for the focus of the questions addressing particular 
research objectives).  
3.2.2.3 Individual interviews  
Individual interviews with fishers in each case study 
As mentioned above, in each of embedded case studies two fishers were 
interviewed individually to clarify, triangulate and/or further explore the issues where 
the focus group discussion had not given complete answers.  
Fishers for individual interviews were selected purposively, based on the 
suggestions of other fishers. As the issues needing to be clarified or explored further 
emerged from the focus group discussions or from the field observations of the 
researcher, questions were developed differently case by case based on the issues 
to be explored and/or clarified. Depending on the number and scope of issues to be 
asked, the duration of the interviews was also different from case to case, ranging 
from about a half to one hour. These interviews were conducted by me.  
Individual interviews with staff in-charge of fisheries management at commune level 
(Commune People’s Committee): The six case studies in this research are located in 
six different communes. Therefore, in each case study a staff in charge of fisheries 
management at commune level (Commune People’s Committee - CPC) was 
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interviewed to understand CPC’s perceptions about FA, the relation and cooperation 
between CPC and FA in building and implementing co-management, and policy 
issues in each case study (see key interview questions in Annex 3).  
Individual interviews with resource managers at district and provincial level, co-
management expert and project / NGO staff and staff of Provincial Fisheries 
Association  
These interviews were not part of the embedded case studies, they were for across 
cases.  
Table 3-2 shows the number of individual respondents in interviews with resource 
managers, co-management experts and project / NGO staff 
Table 3-2: Number of individual respondents 
Respondents 
Number of 
respondents  
Provincial fisheries resource managers (Provincial 
Sub-department of Fisheries Protection and 
Exploitation) 
1 
District fisheries resource managers (Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development)  
2 
FA management board at province level 1 
Co-management consultants* 2 
Staff working in fishery resource management 
projects, NGOs* 
3 
Total 9 
*These co-management consultants also worked for NGOs and or donor funded projects.  
These informants were selected through purposive sampling methods. This meant 
only those who had knowledge, experience or were involved in fisheries 
management in Tam Giang were selected for interview.  
A total of 9 individuals who were fisheries resource managers at district and 
provincial levels, co-management experts /consultants, staff of donor-funded projects 
and NGO staff were interviewed, by me. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes 
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to one and two hours (the interview with co-management experts and fisheries 
managers at provincial level lasted the longest time). A set of key questions was 
prepared in advance for each group of informants (e.g. resource managers, co-
management experts, policy makers, fishers) (See key interview questions in 
Annexe 3). I first drafted a list of information that I sought from them that addressed 
the research objectives. Then I developed questions to elicit this information. Though 
the same list of key questions was prepared, only relevant questions were selected 
from the list to ask the relevant informants. The questions focused on four aspects: 
background information, co-management arrangement, factors affecting co-
management and co-management outcomes.  (See more details about the interview 
contents in methods sections of chapters 4 to 8).  
3.2.2.4 Survey  
Survey sampling  
Random sampling was used to select respondents for the survey, from the list of FA 
members that was provided by each FA management board. Where an FA’s 
member list was divided into sub-categories, e.g. by location, or by type of fishing 
gear, the selection was stratified in order to achieve a set proportion of each sub-
category. For instance if an FA with 160 members had member categories of 80, 40 
and 40, the sampling was stratified to ensure that ratio in the eventual sample was 
2:1:1. The sampling was then conducted by choosing every second household on 
the list. Accordingly, in each case study 32 to 51 fishers were surveyed, accounting 
for at least  40 per cent of FA members and involving a total of 252 survey 
respondents across the six cases (Table 3-3). As fishing is mainly done by men and 
all of the members of the case study FAs were men, the survey respondents were all 
male. Since gender was not a focus of this study, this was not considered a 
limitation.  
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Table 3-3: Survey sample size 
Case study 
No. of FA 
members 
(at November 
2013) 
Survey sample 
Size 
Percentage of 
FA 
membership2 
1 61 32 52% 
2 89 42 47% 
3 104 42 40% 
4 76 44 58% 
5 90 41 46% 
6 115 51 44% 
Total 535 252 47% 
 
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire consisted of five sections (see Annex 4). The first section was an 
introduction of the research purpose, interview time, place, and interviewer. The 
second section included the questions about the background of interviewees. The 
last three sections were designed to meet three main research objectives: (i) co-
management building, (ii) co-management implementation and (iii) the outcomes of 
co-management.  
The questions in the questionnaire were closed-ended questions. These questions 
offered a set of pre-designed replied such as “Yes/No”, multiple choice responses, or 
gave the opportunity to rate strength of feeling or attitude (Gray 2009).  
The questionnaire for this research was designed to be completed in 30 to 45 
minutes. It was filled in by interviewers in face-to-face interviews. Though this 
method was time-consuming, it ensured that all questions were understood correctly 
and answered fully, and there was a high response rate (Burns 1997). As some of 
the surveyed population were illiterate, the presence of an interviewer was crucial.  
                                                          
2 As some of the respondents selected were not available or found for interview, the percentage FA 
membership involved in the survey was lower than the target 50%. In cases 1 and 4, the sample size 
was larger than 50% because pilot interviews were conducted in these cases and those answering 
what became the final version of the questionnaire were included in the sample size. As the pilot 
sample was selected randomly, this does not have impact on the representativeness of the survey 
sample.  
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Survey procedure 
The survey was conducted with 252 fishers in the six embedded case studies. There 
were three interviewers, myself and two hired fieldwork assistants. I was responsible 
for monitoring and overseeing the interview process and quality. The interviewers 
were given a half day training by me. The purpose of the training was to clarify the 
aims and objectives of the research to the interviewers, to clarify the research target 
groups, the selection of interviewees, instructions for conducting the interviews, 
clarification of each question, expectations on data recording, and to clarify the 
questions raised by the interviewers. One of the interviews also joined the pilot 
testing of the questionnaire with me (the other interviewer was not available to join).  
3.2.3 Data recording and analysis 
3.2.3.1 Data recording 
The information from focus group discussions and individual interviews were written 
down by a note taker on paper. I also took the important notes of the discussions in 
my notebook. The notes on each interview / discussion were taken on separate 
pages. The information provided by survey respondents was recorded directly on the 
questionnaire, against each question.  
3.2.3.2 Data analysis 
Information from all methods was categorized into different themes to match the 
research questions. These were (1) background, (2) co-management building, (3) 
factors affecting co-management implementation, and (4) co-management 
outcomes. 
Analysis of focus group discussion and individual interview data 
The data were categorized separately for each study case and then generalization 
was made across the cases. In each theme, (background, co-management building, 
co-management implementation and co-management outcomes), the information 
was categorised further into three components: 
(i) situation description (what happened, how it happened), (ii) the factors affecting 
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the situation (why it happened) and (iii) solutions, recommendations (if any) (what do 
to, what should be done).  
The interview data were analysed through a six step process (Figure 3-3). 
Step 1: Organizing and preparing the data. This involved sorting and arranging the 
data by source of information, and typing the interview notes into Microsoft Word.  
Step 2: Reading through all the data to obtain a general sense of the information and 
reflect on its overall meaning.  
Step 3: Sorting the data. The data was sorted by content according to the research 
conceptual framework. MS word was used to sort the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Qualitative data analysis process (adapted from Creswell (2009) 
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Step 4: Generating a description and themes based on the sorting process. This 
involved locating the sorted data to create different themes (e.g. background, co-
management development process, co-management implementation and co-
management outcomes) and categories (e.g. donors, leadership, power, outcomes) 
or sub-categories  (e.g. social outcomes, ecological outcomes) . This step also 
involved a description of information about people, places and events in a setting 
(e.g. resource attributes, social attributes, etc.). Themes were created for each 
individual case and across the different cases.  
Step 5: Presenting the themes and descriptions in the qualitative reporting to convey 
the findings of analysis with illustrations such as quotations, pictures, stories.  
Step 6: Interpreting the data. These were generalized based on the findings or were 
derived from a comparison between findings and literature.  
Analysis of survey data  
The questionnaires were coded by numbers and by study case. For example VA1 
was the code of the first questionnaire of the study case Village 8 FA. Giving a code 
to each completed questionnaire helped the researcher to trace data when needed. 
The survey data was coded into two categories: categorical data and quantifiable 
data (Gray 2009). Categorical data was the data that could not be quantified 
numerically but could be placed into either sets or categories. The categorical data 
were coded by number. For example, a respondent who was a member of FA 
management board was coded as 1 and one who was an ordinary FA member was 
coded as 2. Quantifiable data was the data that could be presented numerically, for 
example income, number of fishing gears, level of trust.  
Survey data was analysed with MS Excel by using descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Descriptive statistics described the basic features of the study results using 
tables, charts or graphical analysis (Gray 2009). These enabled summary of features 
of the data such as means, for example the average level of trust of fishers in their 
FA leaders. Inferential statistics were used to draw conclusions beyond the data 
(Gray 2009), using statistical tools to show correlations between variables. For 
example this research used inferential statistics in the correlation between the level 
of trust in FA leaders, and fishers’ participation in co-management. 
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The information was used in different chapters (papers) as shown in table 3-4. 
Table 3-4: Allocation of information into chapters 
Information 
sources 
Themes analysed Information usage 
Secondary 
data 
Co-management building 
Co-management outcomes 
Chapters 4 and chapter 8. 
 
Focus groups 
discussion  
(1) Background of co-management.  
(2) Co-management building.  
(3) factors affecting co-
management. 
(4) co-management outcomes. 
Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
Chapter 8.  
Individual 
interviews  
(1) Background of co-management.  
(2) co-management building.  
(3) factors affecting co-
management. 
(4) co-management outcomes. 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Chapter 8.  
Survey (1) Respondents’ background,  
(2) Co-management building 
 (3) factors affecting co-
management implementation 
 (4) Co-management outcomes.  
Chapters 4 and 8.  
Chapter 4. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7   
 
Chapters 6 and 8. Chapter 5: only 
one type of data (mesh size) 
under theme 4 was used.  
Information 
from previous 
studies 
Co-management outcomes Chapter 8. 
The data analysis and generalization of the research findings are presented in the 
next five chapters.  
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Chapter 4    
Building Fisheries Co-management in a Developing 
Country: Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam 
Chapter 4 comprises the manuscript “Building Fisheries Co-management in 
Deveoping Country: Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam.” by Ho, N. T. T., H. Ross, and J. 
Coutts. 
 
Plate 4: Fishers marking border of protected area 
(Photo: Thua Thien Hue Province Department of Fisheries Resource 
Exploitation and Protection) 
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Building Fisheries Co-management in a Developing Country: Tam Giang 
Lagoon, Vietnam 
Nga Thi Thanh Ho1, Helen Ross and Jeffrey Coutts 
School of Agriculture and Food Sciences, the University of Queensland, Australia 
1 Corresponding author. Email: thi.ho3@uq.net.au   
 
Abstract:  
Co-management has been widely documented in different parts of the world, yet 
very limited knowledge has been shared about the initiation and design of co-
management in developing countries. This paper examines the development of 
fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam, a complex area where an 
uneven co-management regime has been established under the influences of 
different international development agencies, and across different combinations of 
wild fisheries, aquaculture and marine sanctuary. The findings show that co-
management has evolved incrementally as a response to problems, rather than co-
management being a consciously designed or negotiated system. The evolution of 
co-management has also been driven by external agencies after trials of community-
based resource management showed limitations. Co-management emerged as a 
system consisting of 64 local units (Fishery Associations) on a scale that is possible 
for fishers to cope with. However, the emphasis on the single units without 
consideration for the whole system has resulted in an inconsistent set of 
arrangements in which some Fishery Associations can exercise more power and 
thus bear more responsibility than others though they use the same resources. 
Meanwhile open access persists in some areas yet to be brought under co-
management. In this situation, actions need to be taken by co-management partners 
and other stakeholders to improve the linkages among single co-management units 
and the consistency of the entire co-management system.  
Keywords: TURF, Fishery Association, adaptive co-management, governance, 
environmental change  
4.1 Introduction 
Co-management, a system for sharing authority and responsibility between 
government and resource users, has been recognized internationally as an approach 
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for more effective management of fisheries. Co-management presents a solution that 
reduces fisheries resources from vulnerability to depletion due to their open access 
status (Pinkerton 1989a; Wilson et al. 2003). In the context of conflicts among 
resource user groups and between government and users, and fish stock depletion 
in fisheries resources, co-management agreements between government and 
resource users have provided an approach to halt resource degradation, improve 
equality in resource access and use and promote sustainable fisheries resources 
(Pinkerton 1989a). 
In many developing countries, there has been a transformation of fisheries 
management from government-led approaches, to co-management (Hara & Nielsen 
2003; Symes et al. 2003; Armitage et al. 2011a). In many cases the transformation 
has occurred under the support of external agents such as researchers, scientists, 
NGOs and donor funded projects (Norman et al. 1997; Pomeroy & Ahmed 2006). 
For this reason, the approach to building fisheries co-management in developing 
countries is different from that in developed countries where the intention to co-
manage and design of the system comes directly from the co-managing parties 
(Metzner et al. 2003; Symes et al. 2003). Although there has been research on co-
management in Asia (Pomeroy & Pido 1995; Makino & Matsuda 2005; Pomeroy & 
Ahmed 2006; Makino et al. 2009; Matsuda et al. 2010; Armitage et al. 2011b), there 
is limited research focused on the ways in which fisheries co-management is initiated 
and built up in developing countries.  
In Vietnam, there has been a transition in fisheries management in which co-
management was introduced as a new approach to resource management (Pomeroy 
et al. 2009; Truong et al. 2010; Armitage et al. 2011b). Although the concept of “co-
management” was first introduced to the Ministry of Fisheries in mid-1990s (ADB 
1999a), the fisheries co-management arrangements - that are about sharing power 
and responsibility between government and community - did not exist until the late 
2000s (Lai 2008). The fisheries co-management system in Tam Giang lagoon, 
Vietnam is considered to be the first fisheries co-management model in Vietnam 
(Tuan et al. 2010). Investigating how this first co-management system was built up 
and understanding the pitfalls of the system would be useful for stakeholders, 
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especially policymakers and resource managers, to better develop co-management 
systems in other parts of Vietnam.  
This paper explores how fisheries co-management emerged and is organized in Tam 
Giang Lagoon, Vietnam, as an example of how co-management has evolved in a 
developing country, under the influence of participatory action research teams 
supported by international aid agencies. While parts of this history and system have 
been reported, from the perspectives of the researchers who were involved in 
creating the system (Truong et al. 2010; Armitage et al. 2011b; Takahashi & Duijn 
2012), there has not been a holistic examination of the entire system. This paper 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of the development and application of 
co-management, as an exogenously-introduced new management approach to 
common pool resources in Vietnam, a communist regime where natural resources 
belong to the government. It also aims to contribute to improving practical knowledge 
of donors, policy makers, resource managers, researchers and resource users in 
building co-management in developing countries.  
4.2 Tam Giang Lagoon  
Tam Giang – Cau Hai lagoon system in Central Vietnam (well-known as Tam Giang 
Lagoon) is a complex social, environmental and economic system. About 300,000 
people live in and around the 33 lagoon communes (commune is the smallest unit in 
the Vietnamese government administrative system), of whom approximately 100,000 
people depend directly on lagoon resources. The others earn their living from coastal 
agriculture combined with part-time aquaculture and capture fisheries (TTHSO 
2011). The lagoon system has a diversity of aquatic habitats that are the home of 
many marine and brackish water species and is an ideal location for aquaculture 
(Thung 2007). Tam Giang Lagoon includes wild fisheries, aquaculture, and a system 
of eight marine sanctuaries. 
Lagoon uses are both dense and diverse. The lagoon has 29,000 ha of aquaculture 
ponds located in and around it (DARD 2010). In addition, the lagoon is exploited 
daily by more than 7,000 fishing households who use 32 different types of fishing 
gear (TTHSO 2011). In this context there has been increasing competition between 
fishers which led to the use of high capacity and efficient fishing gear including 
destructive methods such as electric shock devices and small mesh size nets (Le 
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2006; Thuan 2010). The development of aquaculture and the number of fishing 
households has reduced the lagoon’s open area and infringed on the protected 
areas and navigation lanes. The dominance of aquaculture farms, fixed fishing gear 
and mobile fishing gear with greater capacity have marginalized or eliminated poor 
fishers who cannot compete with those who have advanced fishing gear (Tuyen 
2010). In this context, small scale mobile fishing families, who are considered the 
poorest groups in this area, become more vulnerable to poverty because they lose 
livelihoods. 
Tam Giang Lagoon also reveals a complexity and diversity of property rights. While 
aquaculture areas and fish corrals have been privatized, a large area of the lagoon 
which is designated as government property (navigation lanes, primary waterways, 
secondary waterways and open areas) is still open to fishing access (Huong, 2010). 
In addition, unclear definition of property rights over the lagoon area has made the 
management of the lagoon more complex. Lagoon areas are under two types of 
property rights: de jure and de facto (Huong 2010). De jure is a property right 
specified, granted and enforced by the government. De facto refers to a property 
right that originates among resource users, is observed by individual resource users 
and recognized by other users but without government recognition (Schlager & 
Ostrom 1992). However, the de jure and de facto property rights have changed over 
time. These rights co-exist and overlap in many types of resource use and in some 
cases, it is difficult to distinguish them (Huong & Berkes 2011). In addition, many 
resource users act without rights (Sau & Phuong 2010; Huong & Berkes 2011). The 
unclear property rights of the lagoon resources - and especially undefined property 
rights in the open water area - has resulted in the over-exploitation of resources and 
conflict between resource users.  
Under the further pressure of population growth, lost fishing grounds due to 
expansion of aquaculture and destructive fishing techniques, the lagoon resources 
are under serious threat and competition in access and use of lagoon resources 
between resource user groups increased (Thanh & Hoi 1994; Tuyen 2002; Thung 
2007). In that context, co-management has been introduced to Tam Giang Lagoon 
incrementally, as part of attempts to resolve the natural resource management 
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problems and user conflicts that had proved impossible to solve under a top-down 
management approach.  
Before 1945 the lagoon area was managed by village authorities who annually 
auctioned off fishing ground rights to fisher groups (known as “vạn”) (Nguyen & Kim 
2011). A “van” was a group of fishers’ families who shared kinship, or lived in the 
same geographical area or used the same types of fishing gear (Ha & Nguyen 
2009). “Van” were granted with fishing rights from the village authority through 
auctioning. Accordingly, the auction winners had to pay tax to the village authority 
and in turn, they could hold long term rights for the use the auctioned areas (Nguyen 
& Kim 2011). After 1945, there was a difference in resource management regime 
between the North and the South of Vietnam. In the North, natural resources 
including coastal waters belonged to the state and were managed by cooperatives. 
Tam Giang lagoon which belonged to the South Vietnamese Government was 
controlled by village authorities as in the previous period (Ruddle 1998). After the re-
unification of Vietnam in 1975, all natural resources were considered as state 
property, following the northern system. The government considered “vạn” as an 
institution of the former political system that could be a barrier to the socialist 
revolution, therefore the traditional institution was disbanded (Nguyen & Kim 2011). 
Today “van” is remembered as a past local institution that no longer plays any role in 
the state fisheries management system. However, according to Ruddle (1998), 
“although it [van] is not officially recognized, many senior provincial fisheries officers 
understand the potential of van as a vehicle for local fisheries management” (p. 20).  
From 1975 the lagoon became the people’s property and on behalf of the people, the 
Vietnamese government at different levels became responsible for management of 
this resource. The centralized management system, which did not take into account 
the role of the traditional management system (Van), resulted in fisheries problems 
(e.g. overexploitation, fisheries degradation). To deal with these over-exploitation 
problems, there has been interest in improving fisheries management in the lagoon, 
ultimately leading to the development of community-based management and co-
management.  
 
 60 
 
4.3 Why co-management and what it is about? 
Since early the 1990s fisheries resources in Tam Giang Lagoon, which was under 
centralized management system, has presented a rapid decline as a consequent of 
overexploitation (Brzeski & Newkirk 2000, 2002). The collapse  of fisheries resource 
caused different factors including management problem and the access status of the 
lagoon. The conventional management approach by the government had presented 
several weakness that could not deal with fisheries problems. These weaknesses 
included insufficient staff, limited financial resources for monitoring and enforcing 
fisheries regulation at local level, lack of stakeholder participation, and poor 
communication among stakeholders (Takahashi & Duijn 2012). In addition, in theory 
Tam Giang Lagoon is considered as the state’s property but in practice it is 
perceived by fishers as a common pool resource where everyone has access the 
government regulation approach does not limit who has access to fish, or how many 
people can fish, only the size they can catch and gear they can use). The open 
access status of the lagoon led to over-exploitation, depletion of fisheries resources 
and conflict between lagoon user groups.  In that context, according to the interview 
with resource managers and project staff, co-management was introduced to Tam 
Giang Lagoon to solve the management and fisheries problems. The aims of co-
management is to get fishers involved in fisheries management in order to use 
lagoon resources effectively and sustainably.  
In fishers’ point of views, co-management is necessary because as stated by fisher 
that “Only Tam Giang fishers can understand Tam Giang fish and deal with Tam 
Giang fisheries problems”. In focus groups discussion, fishers also explained that 
fisheries problems happen every day in the lagoon and government agencies do not 
have time, money and staff to deal with these problems. In addition, government can 
only deal with fishers through laws but, as said by many fishers that sometime laws 
can’t help, but neighbourhood does.  
Though the concepts of co-management was introduced to Vietnam in early 1990s 
(Lai 2008), there have been a long debate on the concept of co-management 
between resource management stakeholders  in Vietnam. There was not  any official 
definition of co-management  until 2010, when it was first defined in a Vietnamese 
official document that “co-management is a management approach in which 
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government share management rights, responsibilities and functions with resource 
users” (MoF 2010)  However, in practice, according to (Swan 2010) p.28  “Within 
Viet Nam, the understanding of the co-management concept is variable”. While 
some NGOs and international donors perceived co-management as power and 
responsibility sharing, others considered co-management as community-based 
management” (Swan 2010).  In Tam Giang Lagoon the concept of fisheries co-
management is influenced by an Canadian funded project who grasped 
“international standards” of co-management  which is “power and responsibility 
sharing”.   
Co-management approach offers fishers in Tam Giang Lagoon work with 
government through their association (Fisheries Assocaition_FA) to manage lagoon 
fisheries. The co-management between government and fisher is arranged through 
allocation of Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURF) to FAs.  Through co-
management fishers can contribute resources (e.g time or labour) and knowledge for 
fisheries management through co-management activities. These co-management 
activities identify by fishers include: 
- Developing FA regulations 
- Enforcing FA regulations 
- Monitoring the compliance with FA regulations of other fishers 
- Reporting violators  
- Patrolling 
- Pursuing violators 
- Participating in sanction process 
- Gathering and reporting fisheries resource data and violating information  
- Participating in making plans  for fisheries resource use and development 
- Participating in FA meetings   
- Participating in re-arrangement  of fish corrals   
- Developing proposal for obtaining fishing rights (TURF).  
4.4 Methods 
Six fishing communities that are represented by their own organizations, Fishery 
Associations (FAs), were studied in late 2012 and early 2013. The cases were 
designed to be representative of different parts of the Tam Giang Lagoon system, 
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the diversity of fishing activities, the co-management status of each FA with 
government, and the co-management duration (Figure 4-1). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Study area and study cases, Tam Giang Lagoon, Viet Nam 
 
(Adapted from Armitage et al. (2011b) (Study case locations are marked with black 
circles). 
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Table 4-1 summarises the features of the case studies. 
Table 4-1: Case study features 
Case 
study 
Location Main fishing 
activities 
Co-
management 
status 
Year of 
forming 
of FA 
Year of 
allocation 
of TURF 
 1* Tam Giang 
Lagoon 
Fixed fishing  Formal 2006 May 2012 
 2* Tam Giang 
Lagoon 
Mobile fishing 
and pond 
aquaculture 
Informal 2008 No (as of  
01/ 2013) 
 3 Sam Chuon 
lagoon 
Net enclosure 
aquaculture and 
mobile fishing 
Formal  2006 Nov. 2012 
4* Ha Trung lagoon Fixed fishing, 
mobile fishing 
Formal 2005 July 2010 
5 Cau Hai lagoon Mobile fishing 
and aquaculture 
Formal 2007 Sep 2011 
6* Cau Hai lagoon Fixed fishing Formal  2008 May 2009 
* FA area includes a marine sanctuary 
TURF: Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries  
Formal co-management:  FA is formally recognised, by allocation with TURF  
Informal co-management: FA has not yet been allocated with TURF 
 In each case study, two focus groups of six to eight people each were conducted, 
one with members of the FA executive board (all of whom were invited) and the 
other with ordinary members of the FA. The focus groups were conducted separately 
to avoid the possibility of the FA executive board members dominating the FA 
members in discussion or their presence making ordinary members reluctant to 
speak openly. The members of the FA were invited by the Head of the FA executive 
board one day prior to when the focus group was to be held. The selection of FA 
members for the focus group discussion was based on criteria set by the research 
team to ensure a mix of: representatives of aquaculture farms (if any) and fishermen; 
different fishing activities (different mobile fishing gear, fixed fishing); members from 
different sub-FAs; different geographical areas in the FA; and fishermen of different 
ages. The group interviews were facilitated by one member of the research team and 
the interview notes were taken by a field assistant. A list of key open-ended 
questions was prepared. Related to this chapter, the questions asked were: 
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1. How was fisheries managed before co-management was arranged?   
2. What were the problems of fisheries management? 
3. How was co-management evolved?  
4. How was co-management arranged?  
5. What is co-management about? 
6. What are advantages and disadvantages of the co-management system?  
After the focus group discussions had been conducted, two fishers in each case 
study area were also interviewed individually to investigate the insights and 
triangulate information from the focus groups. They were selected, based on the 
recommendations of the focus group participants, as individuals who had not 
participated in the focus groups and could best provide insights into the issues 
raised.  
Fifteen interviews were also conducted with key informants who were fisheries 
resource managers from provincial, district and commune levels, Provincial Fisheries 
Association, co-management experts and staff of projects and organizations working 
in fisheries co-management.   
Interview information was analysed based on the process of (Creswell 2009). The 
information was sorted and arranged by source of information before the interview 
notes were typed. Then all the data was read through to obtain a general sense of 
the information and reflect on its overall meaning. The data then was coded by 
content or topics according to the major research questions. After that, the coded 
data was allocated to different themes (e.g. background, co-management 
development process and initiation, co-management policies and co-management 
outcomes) and categories (e.g. co-management initiator, factors affecting) or sub-
categories. A description of information about people, places and events in a setting 
(who, when, where, what, and how) was also prepared. Finally themes and 
descriptions were presented in the qualitative narrative by using a narrative passage 
to convey the findings of analysis with illustrations such as quotations, numbers, and 
stories.  
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4.5 Fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon 
4.5.1 The commencement of fisheries co-management  
Co-management began to evolve in Tam Giang Lagoon in the early 2000s after the 
perceived failure of the state management system and the instability of community-
based management pilot models between the 1990s and the 2000s (Figure 4-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: The evolution of fisheries management approaches in Tam Giang 
Lagoon, Vietnam 
Because the government management system did not have enough staff to deal with 
resource management, and the top-down management was perceived to have been 
unsuccessful, community-based management approaches were piloted in parts of 
the lagoon area between the early 1990s and early 2000s (Brzeski & Newkirk 2000, 
2002). This management approach involved sharing knowledge between research 
teams and communities and made use of local experiences in the management of 
the lagoon. However, these pilot models were seen as unsustainable because the 
operation of the community-based management system relied heavily on the support 
of external donor agencies (Nguyen 2008). In addition, the research teams which 
developed these pilot models worked directly with local communities and had little 
connection with government. These factors resulted in weak institutional linkages 
between the community and government with the result that the community 
organizations were not recognized by government. This ‘Illegal’ status of the 
community organizations has been identified as the root cause of the failure of the 
Co-management 
From 1975 to early 1990s From early 2000s From early 1990s to early 2000s 
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management solutions  
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community-based management models, as stated by an official of Provincial 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, DARD: 
The root cause of the failure of community-based resource management was 
that these groups were temporary groups and became unrecognized and 
unsustainable after the donor projects terminated. 
In addition, it was argued that the community-based resource management 
approach could not resolve the problems beyond community concerns: 
After six years implementing this project [Canada’s International Development 
Research Centre - IDRC - funded project 1995-2001] and piloting different 
community-based models, we realized that the community-based resource 
management approach could not resolve major issues such as policies, 
institutions, mechanisms, system or network. Lack of legitimacy has been the 
key issue that made them [community-based groups] unsustainable and our 
models fail……….In order to resolve the problems [lagoon resource 
management problems], the involvement of and cooperation between 
government and community is crucial. (A member of the research team of 
IDRC’s project 2005-2011). 
The evolution of fisheries co-management in Tam Giang was undertaken through a 
process (Figure 4-3) that stemmed from the lessons learned from the pilot models. In 
1995 the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Canada 
International Development Agency (CIDA) (referred as IDRC project in this paper) 
started the first project in Tam Giang Lagoon, aiming to improve the legal status of 
fishers in lagoon management. However, co-management was neither a starting 
point nor initial objective of this project. In the first two phases from 1995 to 2001 
IDRC’s project focused on the development of a community-based resource 
management model (Brzeski and Newkirk, 2000, Brzeski and Newkirk, 2002). 
Between 2001 and 2004, another project funded by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the government of Denmark also implemented some pilot 
models on community-based resource management in Tam Giang Lagoon (RIA1, 
2004). The aim of these models was to involve community, especially lagoon 
resource users, in the management process and build their capacity to enable them 
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to protect the lagoon resources at community level. To do this, the projects’ advisors 
facilitated each community to select and form community-based groups in some 
villages. These community-based groups included “self-management boards” (Tuyen 
2000), Government-Fishers Joint Committee for Research (GFJCR) (Ton 2002) and 
“self-management groups” (RIA1 2004). The task of these groups was to encourage 
their community to participate in the protection of lagoon resources. However, these 
community-based groups did not work well as social units and could not continue 
their tasks after the donor-supported projects terminated and thus the community 
based resource management models failed (Nguyen 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Evolution of fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon 
The failure of the community-based lagoon management experiments led the 
research team of the IDRC project to think about a new approach for lagoon 
management. They came to the idea of involving  a legal fishers’ organisation 
(Fishery Association) at the community level in management of fisheries. FA in 
fisheries management, in 2005 the provincial government issued a decision 
(4260/2005/QĐ-UB) for formalising the role of FA in fisheries management and 
recognising FA as a legal organisation to receive fishing rights allocation.  This 
process of fisheries management evolution in Tam Giang Lagoon led the situation 
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that the FAs are authorized to co-manage with government in protection of their part 
of the lagoon system.  
After the legal framework for the allocation of management power to the fisher’s 
organizations had been created, IDRC launched another project on “Common Pool 
Resource Management” in 2008. One of the main objectives of this project was to 
build a fisheries co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon. However, as a pilot 
project, IDRC only focused on three FAs among what was later to become the 64 
FAs in the lagoon. In 2009 the first fisheries co-management arrangement was set 
up by the IDRC project and was recognized as the first fisheries co-management 
arrangement not only in Tam Giang Lagoon but also in Vietnam. For the first time 
ever management power was shared between fishers’ organizations and the district 
government. That led to allocation of territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) to the 
FAs. These pilot models were then expanded by other donor funded projects, 
international organizations, NGOs and government but with variations to the way that 
the IDRC project had established.  
A FA is a social-professional association, recognized by government. Though the 
associations operate at different administrative levels (provincial and community 
levels in the case Tam Giang Lagoon)  but “the most basic unit of Fishery 
Associations operating at the user group, sub- village, village, or commune levels” 
(Armitage et al. 2011b) with limited connection to the higher level due to lack of 
personnel and financial resources for the operation of the assocaition at provincial 
level. In that situation the establishement and operation of a mayority of the  FAs at 
the community level in Tam Giang Lagoon depend on the support of donor-funded 
projects.  
4.5.2 Current co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon 
4.5.2.1 Process of building co-management  
Co-management between a FA and district government was arranged through a 
series of actions in which the project staff and/or consultants played a leading role. 
The information from focus group discussions showed that this process occurred as 
follows. Before the co-management process started, an economic and ecological 
study was carried out by project teams to select places for setting up co-
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management. The co-management process commenced with institutional 
development that led to the establishment of the FA (if not had one) or reinforcement 
of the current FA under the advice and facilitation of the donor organisation’s 
research team or project staff. Then a capacity building program was designed and 
delivered to the FA and relevant government staff by the research team and/or 
consultants to raise their awareness about co-management, environmental 
management and build their confidence and capacity for joint management. The 
FA’s fishery management regulations and fishery resource use planning were 
developed after several meetings among fishers facilitated by the project teams and 
consultation with the Commune People’s Committee and District Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. With the support of the project team the FA was 
allocated with TURF and the members then carried out their new management rights 
and responsibilities with some further support from the projects in some cases (i.e. 
for doing patrols). The process of building co-management was very much the same 
in all case studies.  
4.5.2.2 Co-management unit 
A management unit refers to the “scale” of co-management arrangements. “Scale” is 
defined by the physical size of the area to be managed and the numbers of members 
involved in management of an area (Pomeroy et al. 2001). In Tam Giang Lagoon, a 
management unit is the area of the lagoon that is managed by one FA. Co-
management is built at this scale, and is arranged between government and 
resource users (FA) in that area.  
Under the state fisheries management system, the Tam Giang area is managed by 
33 communes. Under the co-management system, the lagoon is divided into small 
areas based on commune administrative borders, and allocated to FAs for co-
management. Some of the lagoon’s 33 communes have only one FA while others 
have more than one. That is why there are 64 co-management units in only 33 
lagoon communes (TTHFA 2012). Figure 4-4 illustrates the co-management units in 
Cau Hai Lagoon, one of four lagoons in the Tam Giang Lagoon system. A co-
management unit is shown as an area marked by a number on the figure 4-4. The 
areas marked by the same number belong to one commune.  
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Figure 4-4: Co-management units in Cau Hai lagoon (Adapted from Tuyen (2010a). 
Splitting the lagoon into small areas for managment was considered an appropriate 
solution by those who were involved in building co-managment in Tam Giang in the 
beginning: 
We decided to set up a small scale management unit system in Tam Giang 
based on lessons learnt from previous projects. Many management and 
conservation projects in Tam Giang Lagoon failed because they tried to cope 
with the whole system. In fact it is impossible for any authority or agency to 
deal with the whole system. We believed that small is easier to handle than 
big (A reasearcher of the IDRC project, phase 2008 -2010).  
Having a small scale management unit is also recognized as an advantage for both 
government and fishers:  
I think it is a very good idea to divide the lagoon into small plots and allocate 
the lagoon to FAs. On one hand, it builds a management network at the 
community level that helps government to deal with any single and minor local 
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problems. On the other hand, it creates a channel for fishers to share their 
knowldge in lagoon management with government. More importantly, small 
scale is suitable with skills, capacity and knowledge of fishers who mostly 
have low education (A resource manager at district level).  
However, the small scale management system also reveals some challenges. 
Because Tam Giang Lagoon is an open water body, there are close interactions and 
linkages between different areas and communities in the lagoon. Therefore, placing 
the focus on single management units is insufficient for effective management of 
whole system. This is especially the case since the international donor organizations 
only worked with the FAs they funded, making it crucial to have a way of connecting 
the many single co-management units. Co-management form  
The co-management between government and FAs was arranged formally in some 
cases and informally in others. A formal co-management arrangement is established 
through a process that leads to the allocation of TURF. Informal co-management 
happens when FAs are not allocated with TURF but still co-manage with government 
to some extent with respect to the protection of lagoon resources.  
To be eligible for obtaining TURF from the District People’s Committee, FAs must 
meet certain requirements set by the Provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DARD). The requirements include management capacity, ability to 
self-finance for the FA operation cost and the proportion of fishers joining the FA. In 
addition, the FAs regulations on resource management and use must not conflict 
with regulations at national and provincial levels. 
For these reasons, not all FAs are ready to be allocated with TURF. By 2013 only 34 
out of 64 FAs (53%) were allocated with TURF (Figure 4-5). In other words only 
14,000 ha (63%) of the lagoon had been allocated to FAs for co-management so far.  
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Figure 4-5: Number of FAs and number of FA allocated with fishing right between 
2002 and 2013. (Map prepared using data from DARD 2014). 
  
Figure 4-5 shows that, although the government has considered FAs as partners for 
co-management from the early 2000s, ”power sharing” - which is about allocation of 
TURF - did not occur until 2009 when the first fishing right was allocated to an FA. 
This inconsistency in the co-management arrangement has had an influence on co-
management outcomes. The FAs without TURF (meaning the lagoon is still in open 
access status) have no legal authority to punish violators. The unauthorized status of 
many FAs has de-motivated fishers to participate in co-management practices. 
Another factor is that the FAs with TURF can exercise management power but, at 
the same time, they have to bear some responsibility and commitment. For example, 
Giang Xuan FA, which has been allocated with TURF, is recognized as one of the 
best FAs in co-management with government in Tam Giang Lagoon. They collect 
fees from fishers, they have organized fishing registration and they enforce 
regulations to make sure that fishers follow the regulations on the number of fishing 
gear, fishing time and fishing places. However, it was pointed out by a group of 
fishers that 
 
    Lagoon areas allocated with TURF 
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The better we do (cooperate with government to protect resources), the more 
losses we bear. Let us show you an example. Because we follow the rules 
associated with TURF, we have to pay resource protection fees. Meanwhile, 
fishers in other FAs, that do not have TURF and do not have to follow the 
rules, do not have to pay any fees. The lagoon is an open system, fish and 
fisher can move from place to place. So it is not fair for us to pay fees while 
others do not. 
For this reason, though TURF has been considered as an incentive and legal 
foundation for FAs to perform co-management functions, some FAs were not 
interested in gaining TURF. To some extent, the difference in co-management status 
among FAs, who use the same resource body, has deterred both FA with TURF and 
those without TURF from cooperating with co-management practices.  
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Tam Giang Lagoon provides an interesting case of how co-management began and 
has evolved in a developing country context. It has provided some important insights 
into the application and development of an exogenously-introduced management 
concept in a very different political and social context, in this case a communist 
regime.  
Co-management has evolved in Tam Giang as a measure to cope with the decline of 
fisheries resources and the conflicts among resource users. The social, ecological 
and economic complexity of the Tam Giang Lagoon system required a new 
management approach that could address the complexity and diversity of 
livelihoods, property rights and lagoon users. Elsewhere in the world government 
and communities have come together for better management of resources (Wilson et 
al. 2003; Pomeroy et al. 2007). However, in Tam Giang, co-management was not 
the choice of either government or fishers - instead, it was an outcome of sets of 
independently run donor funded action research and development projects seeking 
to resolve fisheries problems. Tam Giang Lagoon thus presents an interesting case 
where co-management is not a consciously designed system. It came about by 
stages of problem solving of the donor rather than as a desire of government or 
community. As a result, government and fishers did not originally plan to work 
together to build co-management. The strong influence and involvement of external 
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research teams have made the co-management in Tam Giang an external-agent 
driven system.  
The fisheries co-management system in Tam Giang partially fits Pomeroy & 
Ahmed’s (2006) concept of “community-based co-management” in developing 
countries. The co-management system in Tam Giang integrates the characteristics 
of both community based resource management (i.e. people-centred, community-
oriented) and co-management (partnership-based). In this case, the community-
based co-management approach was used to address the needs for social 
empowerment and resource management at the same time. However, in this 
process the “community-based” aspect developed before the “co-management”. The 
“community-based” aspect still has a major influence in the co-management process 
due to the fact that the research team that initially designed the co-management 
system was experts in community-based resource management. For that team, 
starting with community was easier than with government or with both government 
and community at the same time.  
As with other countries in Asia (Pomeroy 1995; Makino & Matsuda 2005), there is a 
long history of traditional fisheries management in Vietnam in general and in Tam 
Giang lagoon in particular (Nguyen 1996; Ruddle 1998; Hong et al. 2000; Nguyen & 
Kim 2011). To some extent the organisation and functions of the FA network in the 
co-management system are similar to that of the “van” network in the traditional 
management system which existed in the lagoon before 1975 (Nguyen 1996; Ruddle 
1998). The organisation of the FA or sub-FA is similar to the former “van”, in that the 
members of the FA / sub-FA live in the same area (i.e. Giang Xuan FA consists of 
members who live in Giang Xuan village), or do the same fishing activities (i.e. 
aquaculture sub-FA, mobile fishing sub-FA or fish corral sub-FA). Before 1975 “van” 
were granted with fishing rights and had to pay tax to the village authority and in turn, 
they could hold long term rights for the use of the auctioned areas (Nguyen & Kim 
2011). Currently, FAs are also granted the fishing rights by the government and they 
are responsible for collecting fees and pay a part of the fee to the government. Thus 
to some extent the current fisheries co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon 
has reflected the traditional fisheries management systems of “van” in the old days, 
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with a reform in the institution intended to strenthen the link between local 
community and government.  
Tam Giang Lagoon features a fisheries co-management arrangement based on 
small scale units. While the focus on small units is well suited to fishers working 
together in their FAs and communes, it raises a challenge for management in that a 
large number of separate parts, in different stages of development, do not make a 
successful whole. This has resulted in an inconsistent management system in which 
resource users who share the same resource body hold different rights and 
responsibilities over the resource.  
The incorporation of the small units at the local level into a coordinated system (while 
avoiding unnecessary complexity for the government partner) is necessary. In such a 
circumstance, a nested arrangement for common property resource management as 
noted by Ostrom (1990) might be an effective solution to overcome the current 
weaknesses in the small unit management system. This means the co-management 
system could be organized in multiple layers. For example, the community level (as 
in the current arrangement), could connect into an inter-community level and 
provincial level.  
The Japanese co-management system could be taken as an example to improve the 
current co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon, to promote direct partnership 
between FAs and government, in a way that nests the responsibility of the 
community-based organisations within a supportive government framework. The co-
management system in Tam Giang Lagoon has some similarities with the Japanese 
system of fisheries co-management, although there is no evidence of the Japanese 
system having been considered as a model for Vietnam. The co-management 
systems in both cases were built through allocating TURF to fishers’ organizations. 
In the case of Tam Giang Lagoon there are Fishery Associations (FAs) and Japan 
has Local Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FCAs) or the Fishery Management 
Organizations (FMOs) (Makino and Matsuda, 2005, Matsuda et al., 2010). However, 
while the co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon is mainly developed at the 
local level, the Japanese system is much more holistic, consisting of nested 
coordinating organizations from local level to national level (Makino & Matsuda 
2005). In addition, the Japanese government has been involved in the development 
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of the co-management system as a key partner from the beginning. As a result, the 
co-management systems operate by laws and are nested into prefectural and 
national levels of the government (Makino & Matsuda 2005). In contrast, the 
development of the co-management system in Tam Giang occurred at different 
stages and is inconsistent – lacking a comprehensive plan for development of the 
system.  
As the co-management process did not develop at the same time in all 64 units, the 
process of establishing co-management in Tam Giang is continuing through 
progressive arrangements to establish and allocate TURF to more FAs. Some of the 
co-management arrangements have been successfully set up, but the “scaling-out” 
of these models proved inappropriate due to social and ecological mismatches in 
others parts of the lagoon (Armitage et al. 2008). The social and ecological diversity, 
complexity and uncertainties of the lagoon system, therefore, may require an 
adaptive approach (Armitage et al., 2008) in building co-management in the other 
units rather than expanding the co-management system by simply copying the pilot 
models. In particular, the process of designing co-management arrangements should 
be adapted to suit diverse economic and ecological situations in different parts of the 
lagoon. For example, the arrangement of co-management in a lagoon area with only 
wild fish should not be the same as those areas with aquaculture or a combination of 
wild fish and aquaculture. Likewise, the co-management arrangements with FAs that 
are only involved in fishing should be different from those that include aquaculture, 
and the FAs involved in mobile fishing need to be treated differently to those having 
fish corrals.  
By highlighting the adaptations and learning that have occurred in the development 
of co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon this study can inform the process of 
developing and adapting co-management approaches to other contexts. In 
particular, the paper identifies the elements and potential pitfalls that each context 
needs to consider in bringing together the interests of the different partners and the 
sustainability of the common resource. 
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Chapter 5 
The Role of Donor-Funded Projects in Developing Fisheries             
Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam 
Chapter 5 comprises the paper “Can't three tango? The Role of Donor-Funded 
Projects in Developing Fisheries Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam.” 
by Ho, N. T. T., H. Ross, and J. Coutts, published in Ocean and Coastal 
Management.   
Ho, NTT, Ross, H & Coutts, J 2016, 'Can't three tango? The role of donor-funded 
projects in developing fisheries co-management in the Tam Giang Lagoon system, 
Vietnam', Ocean & Coastal Management, vol. 121, pp. 97-106. 
 
Plate 5: A meeting for announcing the grant of fishing rights to an FA with the 
support of the IDRC funded project 
(Photo: Common Pool Resource Management Project, 2010) 
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Chapter 6 
Power Sharing in Fisheries Co-management                                           
in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam 
Chapter 6 comprises the paper “Power sharing in fisheries co-management in Tam 
Giang Lagoon, Vietnam.” by Ho, N. T. T., H. Ross, and J. Coutts. 2015. Marine 
Policy, vol 53, pp. 171-179. 
Ho, NTT, Ross, H & Coutts, J 2015, 'Power sharing in fisheries co-management in 
Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam', Marine Policy, vol. 53, no. 0, pp. 171-9. 
 
 
Plate 6: Fishers of Giang Xuan FA participated in mapping fishing and 
aquaculture areas in their FA, under IDRC project 
(Photo: Common Pool Resources Management Project 2008) 
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Chapter 7 
The Influence of Fishers’ Leaders on Successful Fisheries 
Co-management: The Case of Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam 
Chapter 7 comprises the paper “The Influence of Fishers’ Leaders on Successful 
Fisheries Co-management: The Case of Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam” by Ho, N. T. 
T., H. Ross, and J. Coutts, in press with Society & Natural Resources.   
 
Plate 7: A FA leader showing the researcher the destructive fishing gears that 
his FA has confiscated from violators 
(Photo: Nga TT Ho) 
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The Influence of Leadership in Fisheries Co-management: The Case of Tam 
Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. 
Nga Thi Thanh Ho a3, Helen Rossa and Jeffrey Couttsb 
a School of Agriculture and Food Sciences, The University of Queensland, Australia. 
b Coutts J&R, PO Box 2681, Toowoomba, QLD, Australia  4350.   
Abstract  
Leadership has been documented as one of the factors affecting successful fisheries 
co-management, yet the attributes of good leadership in fishing communities need 
more analysis. This study investigates the influence of the leaders of fishers’ 
organizations on fishers’ participation in co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, 
Vietnam, and analyses the elements that make a leader influential in that context. 
The findings show correlation between the fishers’ level of trust in their leaders and 
the participation of fishers in co-management. Six attributes give leaders influence 
over fishers: (1) fairness, (2) accountability, (3) acting as a role model, (4) “servant 
leader” (one who focuses on the needs of others), (5) professional competencies 
(resource knowledge and management skills) and (6) social qualities (ethical, moral, 
understanding the community, relation with community). The study has implications 
for selection of appropriate leaders and human resource development in Fishery 
Associations.  
Key words: Fisheries Association, fisheries governance, leadership, resource 
management, trust. 
7.1   Introduction  
Leadership is identified as one of the crucial conditions for co-management in many 
regions of the world (Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Kosamu 2015; Pomeroy et al. 2011). 
Pomeroy et al. (2001, p.200) claimed that “Leaders set an example for others to 
follow, set out courses of action, and provide energy and direction for the co-
management process”. Leaders initiate and promote key processes for natural 
resource management (Pinkerton 1998; Westley 2002). They also play vital roles in 
                                                          
3 Corresponding author: Nga Thi Thanh Ho, School of Agriculture and Food Sciences, The University of 
Queensland. Mail address: The University of Queensland Gatton campus, Gatton, QLD, 4343.  
Email: thi.ho3@uq.net.au  Mobile: +61424252475 
 101 
 
conflict resolution, developing self-organizing processes, building institutions and 
linking resource users with other partners in common pool resource management 
(Ostrom 1990).   
There have been a number of studies on the relationship between community 
leadership and successful resource management (Berkes 2009; Gutiérrez et al. 
2011; Njaya et al. 2011; Russell and Dobson 2011), yet very few studies have 
analysed the elements making a good leader in the context of common pool 
resource management. This study explores the influence of leaders on fishers’ 
participation in co-management, and the elements making an influential leader in 
fishing communities in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam in a context where incentives for 
participating in co-management are not clear due to low statutory support and policy 
for co-management (Ho et al. 2015).  This knowledge is necessary for selecting and 
building appropriate leaders for fisheries co-management in a non-western society.  
Leadership is defined in many ways but in general is considered as a social process 
in which the leaders show their ability to mobilize, influence and guide others toward 
common goals (Burns 1978; Rost 1991). Leadership style has been highlighted as 
important in achieving desired outcomes. There is a range of typologies for thinking 
about leadership. Burns (1978) recognized two types of leadership: transactional and 
transformational. Transactional leadership involves an exchange between the leader 
and the follower (Beckham 1997), providing followers with positive or negative 
rewards based on their performance and outcomes (Trottier et al. 2008). 
Transformational leaders concentrate on the development of followers and fulfilment 
of their needs, by creating trust, seeking to develop leadership in others, showing 
self-sacrifice and serving as moral agents. This type is more likely to bring about 
permanent and self-maintaining changes (Bass 1985).  
Lewin et al. (1939) classified leadership into autocratic (authoritarian), democratic 
(participative) and laissez-faire styles. The autocratic leader makes decisions without 
consultation with others. Democratic leaders, on the other hand, value the inputs of 
members and encourage members’ involvement in decision making. To some extent 
this style is similar to Burn’s (1978) transformational leadership style. Laissez-faire 
leadership involves a delegation of tasks from leaders to members without specified 
measures to attain goals (Goodnight 2004; Lewin et al. 1939).  
 102 
 
Howard (2005) identified four types of leadership. Fact based leaders focus on facts, 
logic, and technical processes to resolve problems. Creativity based leadership, to 
some extent, is similar to Lewin’s  democratic leadership style (Lewin et al. 1939). It 
values creative work, and promotes chances for discussion and clarification. In 
feeling based leadership, the leaders make decisions based on their feelings about 
the situation. Control/power based leaders focus on the control of sequences and 
plans. Once they have made decisions, there is no deviation.  
The attributes of good leadership have been widely studied in sectors including 
business management (Depree 1997), medicine (O'Sullivan and McKimm 2011), 
politics (Bognar 1998), education (Shooter et al. 2012) and the military (Bognar 
1998). A range of attributes are seen to make a good leader (Depree 1997; Othman 
and Rahman 2014). In general the literature emphasizes vision, ambition and risk 
taking, but this may reflect the dominance of business management in the leadership 
literature. In addition, leaders in the business sector are assessed on their meeting 
of challenges at work, their intellectual energy, integrity and innovation (Depree 
1997; Heimbold 1999; Tait 1996). In education, Shooter et al. (2012) have argued 
that integrity and benevolence make a trustworthy leader. Ethics is another valued 
attribute (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999; Ciulla 2004; Othman and Rahman 2014; Price, 
2003). As ethics is considered “the heart of leadership” (Ciulla 2004), a good leader 
should follow moral codes and not compromise on ethics (Othman and Rahman 
2014). 
7.2  Fisheries management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam  
The Tam Giang-Cau Hai lagoon system (well known as Tam Giang lagoon) in 
Central Vietnam, consists of four lagoons: Tam Giang Lagoon in the north, Chuon 
and Ha Trung-Thuy Tu lagoons in the centre and Cau Hai in the south (Figure 7-1).  
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Figure 7-1: Tam Giang Lagoon system 
(adapted from Armitage et al. (2011).  The black circles show the case study sites.   
Until 1975, the lagoon had van, a social organization of fishers, as its traditional 
fisheries management system (Nguyen and Kim 2011). Van referred to a group of 40 
to 70 fishermen who either lived in the same area or used the same fishing gear 
(Nguyen and Kim 2011). Each van was led by a male with occupational experience 
and prestige (Binh, 2009). The leader was a very important and influential person. 
The customary rules that were strongly influenced by van leaders sometimes went 
beyond national laws (“custom rules the law”) (Nguyen and Kim 2011). After the 
unification of Vietnam in 1975, lagoon resources came under state ownership 
(Nguyen and Kim 2011). The boom development of aquaculture in the lagoon in the 
1990s, and  ineffective management since then have led to  serious degradation of 
fisheries (Brzeski and Newkirk 2000).  
To deal with the decline of fisheries, the concept of co-management was first 
introduced in Tam Giang Lagoon in the early 2000s through donor funded projects. 
Co-management was built bottom-up under the influence of these projects, 
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beginning with the establishment of Fishery Associations (FA) that are assigned to 
manage a part of the lagoon. A FA is a social and a professional association that 
cooperates with government in the management of lagoon resources. It consists of 
30 to 120 members who share the same culture, live in the same village, have the 
same main income activities, and have close social and/or blood relationships. Each 
FA is led by an executive board of four to eight people who are elected by fishers 
every four years. When ready, each FA is provided with powers by district 
government to manage fisheries in their area such as patrols, violation and conflict 
handling and fisheries planning. The co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon 
consists of 64 co-management units (FAs). By the time of this study (January 2014), 
64 FAs were formed with some still under development, and 34 FAs were allocated 
with powers4. The intention of co-management was that FAs work in partnership with 
government, but owing to lack of government involvement in the design process led 
by donor-funded projects (Ho et al. 2015), the institutional support is weak and 
government is a somewhat passive partner. The reality is that FAs assist 
government in enforcement action but have limited role in lagoon planning and 
decision making.  
7.3 Methods 
This study was conducted in Tam Giang Lagoon as a single case study with six 
embedded cases5 (i.e. cases within an overarching case study) of fishing 
communities and their FAs (Yin 1994). The cases were selected to represent 
different locations within the lagoon, fishing activities, and backgrounds of FA, FA 
leaders and executive boards. 
In each embedded case study, two focus groups were held, one with all members of 
the FA executive board and the other with 6-8 fishers. A further two fishers in each 
case were interviewed individually to expand insights into research issues and/or to 
clarify the issues raised in the focus groups. A face to face survey with 252 fishers 
(30-50 in each case study, see table 7-1) was conducted. The respondents were 
                                                          
4 District government can formally grant certain fisheries management powers to a FA within 
its territory.  
5 Embedded case studies are cases conducted within a larger case study (Yin 1994). In this 
study, Tam Giang Lagoon is the single case study and the six FAs are embedded cases.  
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selected randomly from the member list of each FA, covering 40% to 56% of the 
membership. The background of each case study and leaders, the survey sample 
size and number of participants in the focus groups are presented in table 7-1.  
Table 7-1: FA and FA leader background, and survey sample and focus group 
participants 
Case 
study 
Main 
fishing 
activities  
Year FA 
was 
formed 
Year 
current 
FA 
chairman 
began  
Main 
livelihoods 
of FA 
chairman 
Background 
of FA 
chairman  
Survey 
sample 
size 
(% of FA 
members
) 
Focus 
group 
attendees 
 
1 Fish corral  2006 2006  Fishing Traditional 
fisher6 from 
this 
community 
 
32/61 
(52%) 
Executive: 6 
Fishers:     8 
2 Bottom 
trap, gillnet 
and pond 
aquaculture 
2008 2008 Fishing and 
aquaculture  
Traditional 
fisher from 
this 
community 
 
42/89 
(47%) 
Executive: 6 
Fishers:     7 
3 Net 
enclosure 
aquaculture
, bottom 
trap and 
gillnet 
 
2006 2006 Aquacultur
e and 
services  
Traditional 
fisher from 
this 
community 
42/104 
(40%) 
Executive: 6 
Fishers:     8 
4 Fish corral, 
gillnet, 
bottom trap  
2005 2008 Fishing and 
non-fishery 
services  
Non 
traditional 
fisher, from 
outside of 
the FA 
community  
 
44/76 
(58%) 
Executive: 7 
Fishers:     7 
5 Bottom trap 
and 
aquaculture 
2007 2011 Non-fishing  Non-
traditional 
fisher   
 
41/ 90 
(46%) 
Executive: 6 
Fishers:     7 
6 Fish corral, 
bottom trap 
2008 2008 Fishing  Traditional 
fisher from 
this 
community 
 
51/ 115 
(44%) 
Executive: 7 
Fishers:     8 
 
 
                                                          
6 Traditional fishers are those who were born and grew up in a fishing family.   
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A further fifteen interviews were conducted with resource managers (9), fisheries co-
management consultants (2) and practitioners (3), and staff of the Provincial Fishery 
Association (1). 
The focus groups and interviews were conducted to gain insights into research 
issues that could not be obtained through the survey, and so support and triangulate 
with the survey data.  
Within the survey five questions related to leadership and participation in co-
management. In each, options were provided for respondents to choose from: 
 Who / what influenced your decision to join the FA?  
 Why do you participate in co-management activities?  
 How much do you trust in the FA leaders?   1 (lowest trust)  2   3   4   5 (highest 
trust) 
 What co-management activities have you been conducting?  
 What would make you continue participating in co-management activities?  
The key informants in the focus groups and individual interviews were asked to 
share their views on the factors affecting fishers’ participation in co-management, the 
role of the leaders of FAs in developing and implementing co-management, the ways 
the leaders of FAs influence their members, and what makes an influential leader of 
a FA.  
For selection purposes, the leaders of FAs in this study were considered to be the 
chairs and members of the FAs’ executive boards at or shortly prior to the time of the 
research. However, many of the results specifically explained the role of the 
chairmen, so in this paper “leader” refers to a chairman and “leaders” refers to the 
executive board of a FA. 
The individual interviews and focus group discussion were recorded on notebooks by 
the interviewers/facilitators and transcribed word for word (apart from irrelevant 
passages) before analysis. The contents then were coded into themes (Creswell 
2009). The survey data were analysed as follows: descriptive statistics were used to 
present responses on the motivation for fishers to participate in FA and co-
management activities. Pearson correlations were used to investigate the 
relationships between the trust of fishers in their leaders and their participation in co-
management. We quantify the level of fishers’ trust in their leaders by taking the 
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mean measure of all respondents on likert scale from 1-(lowest) to 5 (highest). The 
proportion of fishers who participated in co-management activities was calculated as 
a percentage of the total number of fishers surveyed. A fisher is considered as 
having participated in co-management activities if he (all were male) participated in 
at least one of a set of co-management activities previously identified in the focus 
groups, or added under “other” by survey respondents.  
The key attributes of leaders are identified through thematic analysis of the 
interviews and focus group discussions. An attribute was identified as a key one if it 
was mentioned and supported with a particular experience or example in at least two 
interviews or in two focus groups, within at least two of the case studies. . The 
leaders’ attributes were scored by the first author (with one to five asterisks) on the 
basis of the findings from the focus groups and interviews in each case. One asterisk 
was given if the data showed a FA leader performed that attribute very little, or 
negatively. Five asterisks were given if the data showed the leader performed very 
positively in an attribute.   
Data was analysed comparatively (Goodrick 2014) to discover the differences and 
similarities among the embedded cases, and to understand and explain the ways in 
which differences in context influenced the leadership.  
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 The influence of leaders on fishers’ participation in co-management  
The FAs formed to represent the fishers were a very new institution to fishers, so the 
fishers had to be mobilised to join the FAs. In the early stages, the influence of 
outsiders was crucial in increasing the number of fishers joining FAs. The survey 
results showed that fishers joining an FA were influenced by a range of different 
people (Table 7-2).  
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Table 7-2: People that influenced fishers’ decisions to join FAs (multiple choices 
allowed) (n=242) 
Influencing body Frequency 
Percentage of 
respondents  
FA leaders 125 52 
No one 72 30 
Government officers 20 8 
Staff of donor funded projects* 18 7 
FA members 12 5 
Family members 1 0 
(* Staff of donor funded  projects are officers, consultants or advisors working for research or 
development projects funded by NGOs or foreign aid organizations in the lagoon) 
Among the influencing agents, the current or former leaders of FAs, who in most 
cases were the first members of the FAs, had the strongest influence on a fisher’s 
decision to join their FA (52%, Table 7-2). Fishers participating in the focus group 
discussions and individual interviews explained the leaders were role models and 
they followed what their leaders did. A fisher in a focus group stated 
Actually, at the beginning I didn’t know anything about FA. I joined the FA just 
because I knew he (the leader) did it. He is a very knowledgeable person so I 
believe in what he did. 
The survey and focus groups showed that leaders also had a significant influence on 
the participation of fishers in some co-management activities, e.g. patrolling, 
development and enforcement of regulations, monitoring compliance and applying 
sanctions. Since financial incentives for co-management were limited to short term 
support from donor funded projects, fishers had to contribute time or even money to 
conduct the activities, especially after funding ceased. The supports from fishers 
depended on the motivation and encouragement of the leaders. 70% of surveyed 
fishers participated in one or more co-management activities as a result of being 
encouraged or influenced by a FA leader (Table 7-3).  
Table 7-3: Motivation for fishers to participate in co-management activities (multiple 
choices allowed) (n=251) 
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Driving factors Frequency 
Percentage of 
respondents  
Being encouraged or influenced by a FA leader 176 70 
Financial benefits from co-management projects 86 34 
Follow what others do 58 23 
To prevent illegal fishing 31 12 
For conflict resolution 18 7 
No reason 6 2 
Being forced (by local authorities or FA leaders)  3 1 
 
Before the leaders of FAs were officially elected by fishers, a temporary FA 
management board was normally appointed based on the suggestion of local 
authorities or by donor agencies. As well as being among the first to join, the leaders 
of FAs were the first to conduct the co-management activities. They inspired some 
members who influenced the others. As fishing communities have very close social 
relationships (Nguyen and Kim 2011), the influence of the leaders of the 
communities was a starting point for the community to participate in collective 
activities. As some fishers in individual interviews and focus groups explained, 
fishers were likely to be influenced by highly respected people in their community, 
especially those who were their relatives. Some fishers found it difficult to access 
information and resources, so prestigious people like FA leaders led the way.   
There is a close correlation between the level of trust in FA leaders and the rate of 
fishers’ participation in co-management activities (Table 7-4 and Figure 7-2). The 
higher the level of trust in the FA leaders, the greater the percentage of fishers who 
participated in co-management activities. The average level of trust in FA leaders as 
rated by fishers was highest in cases 1 and 6, at 4 and 3.7 respectively, and these 
FAs have the highest rates of fishers involved in practical co-management activities 
(92% and 93%). Meanwhile case 5 has the lowest score for trust in the FA leaders 
and had the second lowest percentage (68%) of fishers participating in co-
management activities.  
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Table 7-4: Trust in leaders and participation rate in co-management  
Case 
study 
Trust likert scale 
Level of trust 
in FA leaders** 
Percentage  
of fishers 
participating 
in co-
management 
activities*** 
1 
Lowest 
2 
Low 
3 
Medium 
4 
High 
5 
Highest 
Median Mean 
1 0 3 8 18 10 4.0 4.0 92 
2 3 17 14 5 1 2.5 2.6 72 
3 2 13 19 3 2 3.0 2.7 64 
4 7 13 16 2 2 2.5 2.5 75 
5 10 20 5 3 0 2.0 2.0 68 
6 1 3 13 12 10 4.0 3.7 93 
** See methods section for the calculation of the level of trust  
***See methods section for the definition of “fishers participating in co-management 
activities” 
Figure 7-2: Correlation between trust in FA leader and fishers’ participation in co-
management (Dot represents cases)  
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The Pearson correlation between level of trust and participation was 0.89 (Figure 2).  
This correlation was statistically significant (p=0.016).   
7.4.2 Attributes of a leader in fisheries management  
Content analysis of interviews and focus groups showed six attributes of leaders that 
influenced fishers in participating in co-management: (1) fairness, (2) accountability, 
(3) acting as a role model, (4) being a “servant leader”7, (5) professional 
competencies (resource knowledge and management skills) and (6) social qualities 
(ethical, moral, understanding community, relation with community).  
Fairness: Fairness refers to the ways that leaders behave or treat their members 
without bias and injustice. In fishing communities where the FA leaders have to work 
with their relatives, the leaders should be seen to assign responsibilities and 
distribute benefits among FA members equally – whether they were relatives or not.  
The focus group discussions and the interviews with resource managers suggest 
that fair assignment of patrolling tasks between FA members affected fishers’ 
participation in resource protection. In most FAs, patrolling is conducted by FA 
members at their own cost and time contribution. In FAs where the leaders shared 
patrolling duty equally between members without favours to anyone, the patrolling 
was carried out very effectively. For example, all case 1 members had to take turns 
to do patrolling. Those who could not do so needed an exemption from the other 
fishers or they had to pay money to the FA. The FA leaders applied this rule strictly 
and equally. As a result, the fishers were willing and happy to undertake patrolling 
when assigned and they perceived patrolling as a regular unpaid job. In cases 4 and 
5, the leaders failed to treat all FA members equally in allocating patrolling duty. 
Some members were favoured by the leaders or the leaders could not force them. In 
these cases, fishers who used to be very willing to conduct patrolling in the early 
days of co-management felt unfairly treated and upset, and some of them no longer 
participated in patrolling. 
                                                          
7 A “Servant leader” as explained by interviewees is one who treats serving the needs of others as the 
primary goal of leadership  
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In the survey, about 17% of fishers stated that they would only continue participating 
in co-management activities if the assignment of responsibility and distribution of 
benefits was fair. Some of the FAs had received support (in materials or finance) 
from donor agencies and the unfair distribution of these resources had made it 
difficult for the FA to encourage the participation of fishers in co-management after 
the financial support finished. As a project officer explained:  
….If the benefits were shared only between FA leaders or with only those that 
the leaders favoured, then the co-management activities may be implemented 
by those who had benefits while the support is ongoing. Consequently, in the 
long term, the FA leaders would fail in mobilizing the community. 
The fairness of leaders in handling violators is also important. In some cases, the 
relatives of the FA leaders did not comply with FA regulations but were not punished. 
As a result the leader could not apply sanctions on any violators in their FA. For 
example the father-in-law of a FA leader fished in a protected area but the leader’s 
wife did not allow him to punish her father. This created a bad precedent in the FA.  
Accountability: Accountability in this study refers to the obligation of the chairman of 
the FA or executive board members to bear responsibility for the tasks that they 
assign to their members. This was very clear in case 1. The members in this FA 
often did as the chairman asked because this man was seen to be always committed 
to take responsibility (legal or administrative) for the actions. This accountability is 
very important in Tam Giang Lagoon as the legal support for implementing co-
management is unclear (Ho et al. 2015).  
The accountability of leaders in using FA funds is also crucial for the FA to get 
support from members and other organizations. For example, case studies 4, 5 and 
6 all had funds for FA activities from income generation activities funded by projects 
or supported by local authorities (e.g. case 6  was permitted by its local authority to 
use funds from selling seaweed). After a few years the funds in cases 4 and 5 
collapsed because their use was not clearly reported within the FAs, resulting in poor 
support from the FA members to maintain the income sources. In case 6, the high 
level of responsibility of the executive board in using funding effectively has been a 
key factor in the FA members’ willingness to develop the seaweed area and for the 
local authority to continue granting use of this resource to the FA.  
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Acting as a role model: The behaviour of the leaders as role models shows clearly in 
implementing government policy. For example when the government needed fishers’ 
cooperation in the reduction and re-arrangement of fish corrals in the lagoon, the 
integrity of leaders in taking some of this loss set an example for other fishers to 
follow. If the leaders complied with regulations and encouraged their relatives to do 
the same, the other fishers were also happy to do so. Where leaders asked other 
fishers to remove their fish corrals without doing so themselves, conflict emerged. To 
explain why the re-arrangement of fish corrals in case 6 was achieved very 
successfully, a commune8 officer said:  
When the district authority requested fishers to re-arrange the fish corrals to 
free an area for water lanes, he [the FA leader] was the first person who 
removed his fish corral. He did not give any favour to his family or his relatives 
in this programme. He also asked other members of the FA executive board 
to do the same.  
The role model behaviour of the leaders in complying with FA regulations also had 
an impact on their fishers. If the leaders failed to comply then fishers would not follow 
the regulations. For example one FA’s area has a marine sanctuary where fishing is 
banned. However, in 2011 one of the executive board members often fished in this 
protected area, as did many of the fishers. As one of the FA leaders was among the 
violators, the leaders were not trusted by fishers and failed to stop fishers from 
fishing in the prohibited area. The situation was only handled after the violating 
leader was punished and dropped from his position.  
This attribute (together with “servant leader” mentioned below) was important to 
most informants: it was mentioned in 10 out of 12 focus groups and by the largest 
number of interviewees.  
“Servant leaders”: This term was used to refer to leaders who do not expect anything 
from the community or government but are willing, foremost, to serve the community. 
In the focus groups, fishers reported that these leaders were self-sacrificing or 
accepted personal disadvantages for the sake of the community. For example, in 
cases 1, 2 and 6, the members of the management boards were the first to make 
                                                          
8 Commune is the lowest level in the Vietnamese administrative hierarchy, under district level. 
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contributions when required, and contributed more than others to resource 
conservation activities. The “servant” behaviour of the leaders has contributed to the 
process of building and developing co-management, especially in those part of the 
lagoon that had no external support from donor-funded projects or where external 
support had terminated. A resource manager explained that: 
In the context that government has not provided sufficient policies to 
implement co-management activities and the supports from the donor funded 
projects are limited, we must acknowledge the contribution of FA leaders for 
their contribution of time and sometimes materials and equipment to set up 
and maintain the co-management system in the lagoon.  
In all case studies the leaders of FAs have been working for their associations and 
helping government in management of lagoon resources without any monthly 
salaries or allowances. In some cases, the leaders received a small amount for 
travel or work allowances from donor-funded projects while the projects continued. In 
many other cases they worked for “the betterment of fishers and fisheries 
resources”, as claimed by FA leaders in the focus groups. 
Professional competencies: Professional qualities in this study refer to personal 
knowledge about fisheries, fisheries management and communication and 
management skills. The focus groups suggested that the FA leaders have a stronger 
influence if they have a good understanding of fisheries issues in their community. 
Professional qualities help leaders in making decisions and plans for fisheries 
management and preventing fisheries overexploitation. They also help the leaders to 
deal more easily with conflicts or problems related to fisheries. The chairs of cases 1 
and 6 were considered by fishers as being professionally competent. They are 
experienced fishers and have good knowledge of the fisheries in Tam Giang.  
The study also shows that a leader with a background in fishing can deal with fishers 
more effectively than one with an aquaculture background. Another professional 
issue is the ability of FA leaders to communicate with their members and 
government or to connect community with other stakeholders. In one case study, for 
instance, some members of the FA executive board could not ride a motorbike (to go 
to the district or province headquarters to attend meetings), and one always 
panicked when talking in public. For that reason a person with limited fisheries 
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knowledge was elected9 as chair of the FA because of his good management and 
communication skills. However the fishers found it more comfortable to communicate 
with other members (traditional fishers) on the executive board than with the 
chairman.   
Professional competence of FA leaders also affects the achievements of FAs. For 
example between 2006-2007 a local NGO helped one FA to set up a small scale 
credit scheme to help fishers using destructive fishing methods to start new 
livelihoods. However, due to poor financial management skills of the FA’s 
bookkeeper and poor monitoring skills of the FA leaders, the fund was lost after a 
few years. No one knew how much money was left in the FA account, how much had 
been loaned out and who got the loans. The failure of this credit scheme had made 
FA members and donors lose trust in the FA executive board.  
Social qualities: A social quality refers to the reputation of the leaders and the social 
capital that the leaders have built in the community. In general, if the heads of FAs 
are prestigious people and respected by fishers, they tend to have more influence on 
fishers. In addition, the fishers have more trust in leaders who were born and grew 
up in the community or those who have similar livelihoods and cultural background to 
theirs. The chairmen of two FAs were not fishers. One of them obtained his main 
income from non-fishery activities and the other from aquaculture. Neither was highly 
accepted by fishers because, as the fishers claimed, they did not really work closely 
with the fishers and to some extent could not understand the fishing community and 
their culture. In addition, as these leaders depended on livelihoods other than fishing, 
their interests and priorities sometimes did not address fishers’ expectations. In 
another case the head of a FA is “a son-in-law” from another community. Though he 
is recognized as a competent leader by the local authorities and even by fishers, 
some fishers did not welcome him as a leader just because he is an “outsider”.  
We also found another interesting situation in one of the case studies where the 
fishers prefer to work with their own leader, not the village leader appointed under 
the government administrative system. This FA is a part of a village including 
agricultural and fishing people where a paid village leader is responsible for 
                                                          
9 In principle, fishers elect their own FA leader, but in practice, local authorities can exert influence, 
especially where the fishers have low education.  
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conducting administration and reporting to the Commune People’s Committee. 
However, the fishers in this village selected another leader, a fisher, and would only 
communicate with this leader to deal with their problems, whether or not they 
concerned fishing. We asked the leader why he did the village administrative work 
for nothing while someone else was paid to do it. He said he liked to do it for his 
community because the fishers felt more comfortable to talk with him, and he could 
understand what fishers said better than a non-fisheries leader. This story reinforces 
the point that the relationship between the head of FA and the community, as well as 
the trust of fishers in the leader, is very important for the leaders to mobilize fishers 
in community activities including co-management. Therefore, the leaders who were 
elected by fishers appear to work better with the community than those who were 
selected with the influence of commune authorities without strong support of their 
community.  
Table 7-5 shows how the attributes of leaders correspond with the level of trust in 
leaders and fishers’ level of participation in co-management. 
Table 7-5: The level of trust in leaders, fishers’ level of participation in co-
management and attributes of leaders 
 
 
Case 
study 
 
 
Level of trust 
in FA leaders 
Percentage  of 
fishers 
participating in 
co-management 
activities 
 
Leaders’ attributes  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
1 Very high (4.0)  Very high (92%) ***** **** **** ***** **** ***** 
2 Medium (2.6) High (72%) *** *** **** **** *** **** 
3 Medium (2.7) Medium (64%) *** *** *** **** *** **** 
4 Medium (2.5) High (75%) *** ** **** ** ** ** 
5 Low (2.0) Medium (68%) *** * * ** ** *** 
6 High (3.7) Very high (93%) **** ***** **** ***** **** ***** 
- (1) Fairness, (2) accountability, (3) “servant leadership”, (4) acting as a role model, (5) 
professional competences, and (6) social qualities. 
- The number of stars * shows the performance level of leaders’ attributes, few stars 
represent poor performance.  
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7.5  Discussion and Conclusions 
Our findings emphasize the crucial role of leadership for engaging fishers in co-
management. In Asia, where co-management is based on the concept of 
community-based co-management (Pomeroy, 2006), the influence of leaders is 
particularly important. In Tam Giang Lagoon, where government policies to support 
co-management activities are weak and the incentives for co-management were not 
clear (Ho et al. 2015), the participation of fishers in the co-management system 
relies on their willingness to volunteer. Under these circumstances it is the leaders in 
the community who are best able to bring fishers together for co-management.  
Though traditional fisheries management, van, no longer exists in fishing 
communities, its culture has a legacy on fishing communities: fishers listen to the 
elders, reputed and respected people in the fishing communities; fishers tend to put 
more trust in the people they know and understand well rather than in those who 
they know less well or who are unfamiliar with their culture.  
This study (Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Pomeroy et al. 2011) identifies the attributes of an 
influential leader in natural resources management in general and fisheries co-
management in particular. These are: fairness, accountability, “servant leadership”, 
acting as a role model, professional competences, and social qualities. Some of 
these characteristics such as fairness and accountability have been found in studies 
on leadership in other sectors (Othman and Rahman 2014) while some differ from 
those of business leaders. While a business leader is highly appreciated for having 
good vision, being motivated, ambitious and independent (Tait 1996), the findings of 
this research highlight the ethical values of the leaders. Acting as a “role model”, 
including setting an example, and serving the community with fairness, honesty and 
responsibility is considered by the research participants as one of the crucial factors 
making an influential leader.  
Among these six attributes of a good FA leader, acting as a role model is particularly 
important in a situation like Tam Giang lagoon where people in the community have 
close relationships in kinship and livelihoods. Peer influence is very important. 
Sometimes people take action because of local conventions rather than the law 
(Tuan and Hang 2014). Community heads or elders, especially reputed people, have 
a strong influence on the villagers and the fishing leaders establish the moral code 
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for fishers. This occurs especially where some of fishers have limited opportunities 
(due to lack of capacity and facilities) to communicate with higher authorities, to 
access information, or to learn about new things, so they rely on their leaders’ 
decisions.  
The overall influence of the leader and attributes of “servant leader” and “acting as 
role model”, reflect a transformational leadership style (Nanjundeswaraswamy and 
Swamy 2014) among the leaders in Tam Giang Lagoon. This leadership style shows 
in the “self-sacrifice” of the leaders for community, the mobilization of fishers and 
setting an example for others to follow. A transformational leadership style appears 
to enable the leaders to inspire and motivate fishers to work together and with the 
government to achieve the shared goals in fisheries management. As Covey (2009, 
p. 287) states “the goal of transformational leadership is to “transform” people and 
organizations in a literal sense - to change them in the mind and heart; enlarge 
vision, insight and understanding; clarify purposes, make behavior congruent with 
beliefs, principles, or values”.  In Tam Giang Lagoon, the leaders have contributed to 
building co-management that transforms fisheries management from centralized 
management to co-management. They have also promoted changes in fishers’ 
perceptions about their role in fisheries management: fisheries management is not 
solely government business, but also fishers’ business.  
Our analysis also indicates that the absence of positive attributes in some FA 
leaders can reduce their effectiveness in co-management. Ineffective leadership is 
caused by poor management skills or lack of professional knowledge on the leaders’ 
part and can result in lack of trust and respect from the community or weak relations 
between the leaders and local people.  
The findings show that trade-offs may have to be made between leaders who lack 
professional skills but are respected by the community, and those who have 
professional skills but are not fishers and therefore not trusted. These choices have 
implications for human resource development for FAs. Firstly, emphasis should be 
placed on developing professionally competent FA leaders to effectively manage 
FAs and handle fisheries issues. As most of the FA leaders are traditional fishers 
with low education backgrounds, training needs to be provided to improve their 
management and interpersonal skills so that they are able to more effectively handle 
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organizational and fisheries issues. Secondly, the election and selection of leaders 
who have professional qualities versus those who have social qualities and 
acceptance should be considered. While professional qualities are necessary for 
effective management of a FA, social qualities of the FA leaders are decisive factors 
in gaining and managing fishers’ participation in co-management. Professional skills 
can be improved through training in a relatively short time, but it takes a long time for 
leaders to gain social qualities to build trust with fishers. The findings suggest that 
leaders with stronger social qualities but limited professional qualities may be more 
suitable in fishing communities than those who have strong professional qualities but 
limited social capital. Finally, the influence of government authorities in the selection 
of FA leaders should be minimized to avoid selection of leaders who are not 
supported or trusted by fishers (see footnote 6).  
The impact of characteristics such as group size and cohesion on co-management 
outcomes (Pomeroy et al. 2001) are reflected in this study.  A co-management 
system with many small scale units like Tam Giang Lagoon has enabled those 
leaders who are fishers to know and understand their group, and to recognize and 
handle fisheries problems in their area, and thus their leadership is effective. In 
addition, the cohesion of FA members, e.g. living in the same geographical area, 
sharing the same culture and having similar background and livelihood activities, has 
also made the leaders more influential.  
Regardless of where co-management is undertaken, and in which sector, the 
participation of resource users is crucial for any co-management system (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Trimble et al. 2014). In that context, 
this study conveys a significant message for those who are engaged in co-
management, about the importance of the role of the community leader in building 
co-management systems. Co-management is about co-operation between 
government and the community, but we can only achieve community co-operation if 
we have leaders who are able to build that co-operation.  
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Chapter 8 
Evaluation of Social and Ecological Outcomes of Fisheries 
Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam 
 
Chapter 8 comprises the paper “Evaluation of Social and Ecological Outcomes of 
Fisheries Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam” published in Fisheries 
Research.  
Ho, NTT, Ross, H & Coutts, J 2016, 'Evaluation of social and ecological outcomes of 
fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam', Fisheries Research, vol. 
174, pp. 151-9. 
 
Plate 8: Fishing boats full of Chinese Lu back at village after a fishing night 
(Photo: Nga TT Ho, 2014) 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Plate 9: A fisher couple fishing with gillnets  
(Photo: Duong Ngoc Phuoc 2013) 
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This research explores the development of a co-management approach in a 
developing country context using the case study of Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. It 
revealed the challenges and legislative gaps for implementing co-management. This 
research provides useful findings for development in natural resource management 
in general and in fisheries co-management in particular. This research has important 
implications for governments and for  donors for the design of effective systems, 
cooperation, and efficient funding. The findings of this research also extend the set 
of factors recognised as affecting co-management internationally.  
9.1 Synthesis of findings 
The findings of the research have addressed the following objectives and research 
questions.  
Objective 1: To investigate how co-management was initiated and arranged in Tam 
Giang Lagoon, Vietnam. 
The research questions asked (1) How was co-management introduced to Tam 
Giang Lagoon? (2) How was the co-management organized? and (3) What are the 
shortcomings of the co-management system and how can it be improved? These 
questions have been addressed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
Fisheries co-management was introduced to Tam Giang Lagoon on the advice of 
donor-funded projects (i.e. an action research project) to resolve fisheries problems. 
It was a result of the evolution of fisheries management in the lagoon that shifted 
fisheries management from centralized management toward co-management under 
the influence of external agencies (i.e. research teams). Co-management was first 
introduced as “pilot models” by a research project in some parts of the lagoon and 
then was expanded into other parts of the lagoon by other projects. The strong 
influence and involvement of external research teams have made the co-
management in Tam Giang an external-agent driven system.  
Co-management was arranged between district government and Fishery 
Associations (FA) for management of small parts of the lagoon. Dividing the lagoon 
into small parts and arranging co-management units for each of these small parts 
proved to be possible for fishers to cope with and has localised strengths. However 
the incremental development of this small unit system formed an inconsistent co-
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management system overall in which some parts of the lagoon have been allocated 
to FAs while others remain in open access. Consequently, fishers have different 
rights and responsibilities, leading to perceptions of lack of fairness and 
effectiveness. 
Cross scale linkages  are identified as the weakest point of the co-management 
system in Tam Giang. In terms of horizontal linkages, there was very limited 
connection between co-management units (FAs). Vertically, the linkages between 
FA, and higher levels of government (district and province) was still weak. To 
improve the effectiveness of co-management, institutional development, and 
coordination between fishers groups and across all levels of the government are 
necessary to link the individual units of the system into a well-integrated nested 
system. 
Objective 2: To analyse the factors affecting the co-management system in Tam 
Giang Lagoon. 
The questions asked (1) What was the role of donor funded projects in building co-
management in Tam Giang Lagoon, and in what ways have these donors influenced 
the sustainability of the co-management system?; (2) What kinds of power have 
been shared between fishers and government, and what factors affect fishers’ 
exercise of the shared power?; and (3) How do the leaders of fishing communities 
influence successful co-management?. These questions have been addressed 
through chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Donor funded projects (research question 1) played multiple roles in development 
of fisheries co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon. The donors involved in design of 
co-management process, led government and resource users in building the co-
management arrangements, provided financial support to form FAs, and enabled 
FAs to conduct co-management activities.  
However, the dominance of project staff in co-management processes had left 
government in a passive position. Most of the project staff or consultants were 
experienced and expert in natural resource management or fisheries co-
management, while the co-management concepts were still very new with FAs and 
government. In that situation the project staff took the leading position in designing 
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co-management processes, roles that needed to be taken by the government and 
fishers. Consequently, the government staff, especially district staff, were involved in 
co-management processes as “invited guests” and they considered themselves as 
“outsiders”. The lower participation and passive position of the government in co-
management has resulted in low ownership of the co-management among 
government and community.  
The bottom-up approach in building co-management that was designed by the 
project teams resulted in insufficient communication with government party at district 
and provincial level in co-management processes. This occurred because the project 
staff worked more with fishers and the commune authorities, than with district and 
provincial government, though the later are responsible for making policies in 
fisheries management. This way of building co-management made the fisheries co-
management system in Tam Giang more like a community based management 
system, in which linkages to government so far remain weak. 
The donor-funded projects had influence on co-management in some different ways. 
Firstly the dependence on project financial and technical support resulted in an 
unsustainable co-management system. Some FAs could not continue co-
management activities after the funding finished while the government policies were 
not in place to support the operation of the co-management system. Secondly, the 
implementation approaches and exit strategies of the donors have also had impact 
on the sustainability of the co-management systems. The phasing out of the projects 
without a strategy for maintaining project achievements has been one of the causes 
of discontinuation of co-management activities. Furthermore, the financial subsidy 
provided by the some projects sometimes went beyond the affordability to 
government pay rate. To some extent, this made it difficult for government to 
continue supporting community in co-management. The subsidy of the projects also 
resulted in a habit among some individuals of “doing and getting paid”. That is not a 
good practice in the context of co-management where the collective action and 
voluntary contribution of fishers are essential. Thirdly, the poor cooperation between 
the projects made the co-management system work less effectively as a whole. The 
focus on single co-management units in a 64 co-management unit system had 
impact on the effectiveness of the overall system owning to the weak connection 
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between these single units. Eventually, the donors only created many strong but 
different systems, rather than a single cohesive and well connected system. The 
findings of the research suggest that coordination from government (in this case it 
would be the provincial authority) is vital to make best use of donor-funded project 
resources, to connect the FAs to improve the consistency of the system, to ensure a 
harmony in funding policies between projects and between project and government 
funds, and to improve the ownership of the government with what is created by the 
projects.  
The research analysed legislative, executive and judicial power (research 
question 2) exercised by the fishers through their FAs. On paper, fishers had 
legislative power to create rules on resource uses within the FA. Theoretically, 
fishers also had executive power that enabled them to reinforce regulations and 
ensure the compliance with rules. Fishers had very limited power in making 
decisions, especially decisions on long term use and planning of the lagoon. The 
research did not find any evidence of judicial power – power to adjust disputes within 
FAs. However, in practice power sharing between the government and fishers was 
limited. The exercise of fishers’ power was restricted by the mismatch between the 
co-management arrangement and government legislation. The co-management was 
arranged from bottom-up with low connection to higher level (provincial level and 
national). This approach of building co-management made the co-management 
regulations inconsistent with provincial and national regulations and resulted in low 
legislative power. Late response from national level in policy reform to “catch up” and 
support co-management processes also contributed to poor legislation of fishers 
power. Lack of legal support has ultimately made fishers’ power very nominal. In 
addition the inconsistency of co-management system in which some FAs were 
granted with TURF, while some were not, made fishers’ power impossible: fishers 
could move to an area for fishing that was not allocated to any FA if they did not 
want to pay fees to the FAs holding TURF.  
The limitations in exercise of power put fishers in an inappropriate position in co-
management. Co-management is about sharing power and responsibility, however, 
in the current situation, fishers can not fully exercise their rights in sharing 
management responsibility with the government. In addition, in government’s point of 
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view FAs are considered as government assistants in fisheries management. In 
other words, FAs are perceived as an added administrative unit helping government 
to implement fisheries management duties. In that sense, fishers participated in co-
management as a policy implementer rather than full co-management partner. In this 
circumstance co-management actually turned into delegation of role and 
responsibility from government to fishers rather than power sharing.  
Institutional, legislative and policy reform is crucial to fully support co-management. 
Legislative reform is necessary to make fishers powers legal and realistic. In 
addition, an improvement in institutional arrangements that strongly connects FAs to 
the higher level of government (provincial level) should ensure integration of 
provincial and national regulations into co-management. Improved vertical linkage 
between different levels in co-management would also create consistency between 
co-management arrangement and legislation at higher levels. Better horizontal 
linkage between FAs would make the co-management system work consistently and 
effectively as a whole.  
The participation of fishers in co-management has been strongly influenced by 
the leaders of FAs (research question 3). More than 50 per cent of fisher 
respondents joined FAs through influence of FA leaders and 70 per cent of fishers 
participated in co-management activities under the encouragement of the leaders. 
The participation of fishers in co-management also depended on how much the 
fishers trust in their leaders.  
To be an influential leader in fishing community, the leader needs to possess some 
essential attributes. These include (1) fairness, (2) accountability, (3) acting as a role 
model, (4) “servant leader” (one who focuses on the needs of others), (5) 
professional competencies (resource knowledge and management skills) and (6) 
social qualities (ethical, moral, understanding the community, relation with 
community). Within these values, the leader acting as role model is the most 
important attribute in a fishing community where people have close livelihood and 
kinship relations. It is likely that in most cases fishers will follow what their leader 
does if the leader proves himself to be a respected and trusted person. The research 
also showed that a leader has more influence on fishers if he has good 
understanding about fishers and fisheries. In addition, in the context of fishing 
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community where most fisheries management activities relies on the contribution 
from fishers, the “servant leader” attribute of the leaders was identified as an 
essential value to mobilize fisheries in co-management.   
The findings of the research provides implications for selection of FA leaders. 
Consideration should be given in selecting leaders who have social qualities and 
professional competencies. This research suggests a person who has good 
understanding of fishers and fishing community with limited fisheries and fisheries 
management knowledge would be more appropriate to be a fishers’ leader than one 
who has good knowledge about fisheries and fisheries management but limited 
connection with fishers and fishing community. The research also suggests that 
fishing communities are more likely to be effectively led by the persons who are from 
the fishing community.  
Objective 3: To analyse the outcomes of fisheries co-management system in Tam 
Giang Lagoon. 
The research questions asked (1) Have there been any social and ecological 
changes in Tam Giang Lagoon since the co-management system has been in 
operation? What are they? (2) How were these changes associated with the 
presence of the fisheries co-management system? (3) What are the factors affecting 
the outcomes of the fisheries co-management system? and (4) What are the 
implications for improving the outcomes of the co-management system? These 
questions have been addressed in chapter 8.  
The presence of co-management through the involvement of FAs in fisheries 
management has brought about positive social and ecological change in Tam Giang 
Lagoon despite the incomplete status of the management system. There were 
considerable perceived improvements in the rate of violation of regulations and in 
resolving conflict between resource users. These improvements were reported in the 
FAs where co-management activities were conducted effectively or where the FA 
leaders have successfully influenced their fisher members in conducting co-
management. The improvement in conflict management and destructive and illegal 
fishing had contributed to improving fish catch, fish size and fish diversity, with no 
further reported fisheries collapse. Compared to 2009, there has been a 
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considerable improvements in fish catch, fish size and fish diversity as perceived by 
fishers in 2013.  
The improvement in fisheries management and resources were gained as the result 
of the participation of FAs in fisheries management. The involvement of FAs in co-
management had improved the enforcement of and compliance with regulation. One 
of the most important results of co-management was that the fishers within a FA 
could monitor each other for better use and management of fisheries resources. 
They have effectively stopped destructive fishing within FAs. FAs also contributed to 
preventing illegal fishing by fishers from outside of the FAs.  
However, the outcomes of co-management varied between lagoon parts (FAs) 
depending on how fishing activities were monitored and co-management was 
implemented by the FAs. The best outcomes were found in the privatized parts of 
the lagoon where the number of fishing gears (i.e. fishing corrals) could be monitored 
and controlled by FAs. Meanwhile, the use of mobile fishing such as steel frame 
bottom trap (Chinese Lu) in open access areas was currently out of the control of 
FAs. Accordingly, the improvement in fisheries resources was reported by most of 
the fish corral owners, but not by mobile fishers. Destructive fishing and illegal fishing 
were improved in the areas where FAs were successful in mobilizing fishers in co-
management activities and where local authorities showed their attention and 
acknowledgement on fishers’ contribution in fisheries management.   
The outcomes of co-management that were achieved during the last few years 
(2009-2013) did not ensure the sustainable development of fisheries in Tam Giang 
Lagoon for certain reasons. Firstly, the implementation of co-management activities 
in communities during this period has been supported by donor-funded projects. The 
discontinuation of co-management activities in some FAs due to lack of financial 
resources after donor-funded projects finished will have impact on the co-
management in future. Secondly, there has been an increase in the number of 
Chinese Lu between 2009 and 2013. However, FAs and government have not had 
effective solutions to prevent the over-quota use of this fishing gear, that would 
threaten the fisheries resource in the long term. Thirdly, as some lagoon parts have 
been allocated to FAs, while other parts are still under open access status, the 
enforcement of fisheries regulations is not carried out consistently throughout the 
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lagoon. This inconsistent compliance with rules would potentially lead to 
overexploitation and destructive fishing in some FAs. These potential risks of the co-
management system once again require a better institutional arrangement that 
enables to linkage across single FAs for effective co-management throughout the 
system. It is also important for the government to support FAs in implementation of 
co-management activities so that the fisheries regulations can be reinforced (i.e. 
control of the number of fishing gear).   
9.2 Discussion  
Co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon  features the elements identified by Pomeroy 
(2006). These elements are motivation for co-management (e.g. the influence of FA 
leaders in chapter 7), initiators of co-management (e.g. the role of donor funded 
projects in chapter 5), scale of co-management (small scale co-management system 
with 64 FAs in chapter 4), representation in co-management (co-management 
arrangement between FA and district government in chapter 4 and 6), and form of 
co-management (e.g. with TURF or without TURF, see chapter 6). These elements 
interact and have impact on co-management outcomes (see chapter 8).  
The initial motivation for fishers to participate in management of Tam Giang Lagoon 
fisheries was the influence of external agencies. In most case studies in fisheries co-
management in Asia, the initial motivation for fishers to co-manage with government 
and other partners has been to achieve improvements in resource health that would 
contribute to social-economic improvements (Nikijuluw 1996; Katon et al. 1997; 
Katon et al. 1998; Khan & Apu. 1998; Masae & Boromtanarat 1998; Thompson et al. 
1998; van Mulekom & Tria) or better use of resources and conflict resolution (Katon 
et al. 1997; Baticados & Agbayani 1998; Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom & Tria). 
Fishers in Tam Giang Lagoon were also faced with the problems of resource 
depletion and conflict, however, co-management was not their initial thought as a 
solution to the problems. Instead their participation in co-management was driven 
and influenced by someone (external agencies or FA leaders) who encouraged them 
to co-manage to resolve fisheries problems.  
The emergence of co-management did not come from the core parties of co-
management - government and resource user. The literature implies that co-
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management is a process in which government and resource users negotiate to form 
an agreement in sharing power and responsibility for management of natural 
resources (Berkes et al. 1991; Berkes 1994; Pomeroy & Berkes 1997). However, the 
evolution of co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon indicated that co-management 
did not always come as a desire of government and resource users. Because, the 
emergence of co-management was strongly driven by the staff and consultants 
employed by the donor-funded projects who played a leading role in design of co-
management for the government and resource users.  
This research once again emphasizes the importance of cross-scale linkages in co-
management development (Berkes 2002; Wilson et al. 2006). One of the 
weaknesses of the fisheries co-management system in Tam Giang Lagoon was lack 
linkage among the single co-management units (FAs) and cross-scale linkage 
between the FAs at community level and higher level (district and province) in the 
design and development of co-management system. Cross-scale linkage becomes 
essential for a co-management system consisting of several small units of co-
management as in Tam Giang Lagoon case.  
The role of donors has been mentioned in the research on developing countries 
(Hauck & Sowman 2001; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Hara & Nielsen 2003). However this 
research provided insights into the influence of the donors on co-management. It 
showed that funding provided by the donors was not the only factor affecting co-
management (Hauck & Sowman 2001), but the way the donors worked to together, 
worked with government and resource users and phased out their funding also had 
impact on the sustainability of co-management. The involvement of the donor funded 
projects in building co-management is crucial for starting co-management in the 
countries where co-management is an “imported” concept like Vietnam, but they 
should have participated in co-management as a project manager or technical 
advisor rather than a project implementer. In the case of Tam Giang the dependence 
on external support could also explain the inconsistency in the co-management 
system in which co-management arrangements were developed incrementally under 
separate donor funded projects that only focused on their own target areas (FAs).  
Rights over resources have been identified as a fundamental requirement for 
successful co-management (Hauck & Sowman 2001; Pomeroy et al. 2001). It was 
 141 
 
also expected to be an incentive to shift the trajectory of resource governance 
approaches (Armitage et al. 2011b; Armitage & Marschke 2013). However, the grant 
of TURF to FAs in Tam Giang Lagoon has not yet supported these assumptions due 
to low legislative support for the granted rights. In addition the incremental 
development of co-management units in a multi-unit co-management system 
resulted in the situation that FAs with TURF in theory, had to bear more 
responsibility (comply with the rules and regulations) than FAs without TURF. This 
research suggests that the rights over resources is only realistic if the legal 
foundation for exercise of the rights is in place. Once the rights are exercised legally, 
it would be a motivation for fishers to obtain the TURF and participate in fisheries 
management. The consistency of the co-management system would also make the 
award of TURF become an incentive for co-management.  
According to (Pinkerton 1989b) the emergence of co-management is expected to 
result in more appropriate, efficient and equitable management. To some extent, the 
co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon has addressed these expectations. The 
participation of FAs in co-management obviously improved the effectiveness of 
fisheries management because fishers participated in monitoring violations and 
enforcement of regulations. More importantly with co-management, fishers have 
mutually monitored the compliance with regulations. Carlsson & Berkes (2005) 
stated that co-management is most appreciated for its function in resolving conflict 
between resource users and government and among resource users. This statement 
was true in the case of Tam Giang Lagoon.  
Though the ICLARM/IFM (1996) framework was used to analyse fisheries co-
management in this research, I found Emerson et al.’s (2012) integrative framework 
for collaborative governance, published after the data collection, also reflects the co-
management system in Tam Giang Lagoon well. This framework consists of nested 
‘boxes’ in which co-management processes sit within and are influenced by co-
management arrangements (institutional arrangements), which in turn are influenced 
with the system context. The system context has impact on the co-management 
design (e.g. the social and economic complexity of the lagoon and the low 
management skill of fishers have been the main factors leading to a small scale co-
management system in Tam Giang Lagoon; the allocation of TURF to FAs was 
 142 
 
designed to solve the open access status of the lagoon). The drivers for co-
management are also impacted by the system context (for example the decline in 
fish stocks, the support from donor funded projects, and the mutual influence among 
fishers in fishing communities). System context also influences the collaboration 
dynamics. These include principled engagement (e.g. the dominance of donor-
funded projects in co-management due to low participation in and lack of co-
management knowledge from the government side), shared motivation (e.g. trust of 
fishers in their leaders, role of FA leaders in development of co-management, 
fishers’ power, and legitimacy and legal support for co-management ) and capacity 
for joint action (e.g. FA leader capacity, fishers’ power, vertical and horizontal 
linkages, facility for conducting co-management activities). These components of the 
co-management dynamics have impact on the effectiveness co-management actions 
such as patrolling, pursuing of violators, and sanctions. The actions then have 
impact on the outcomes of co-management (e.g. reducing the number of violators 
and destructive fishing, better fish stocks). The positive outcomes of co-management 
will improve the lagoon system context in long term. The last component in this 
framework is co-management adaptation where the government and community will 
work together to find out the best ways to maintain the co-management system 
created by donor funded projects, and to create an effective fisheries co-
management system that fits the lagoon context.   
9.3 Contributions to knowledge of fisheries management  
This study is the first research on fisheries co-management that has studied an 
entire process (building, implementation and result) of co-management on the same 
resource body. Thus it analysed causal interaction between co-management stages 
that had been documented very little in literature. In particular this research has 
shown that the initiation and design of a co-management system depending on 
external support resulted in incremental development of the co-management system, 
that made the system inconsistent. The inconsistency of the system has been one of 
the causes of low effectiveness of co-management in the areas managed by some 
FAs. In addition development of co-management with low involvement of 
government in the processes resulted in mismatch in co-management arrangements 
and legal support, that had impact on co-management implementation (i.e. exercise 
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of power). In turn, inconsistency of the system also had impact on the results of co-
management.  
A strength of this research is that it analysed co-management in Tam Giang Lagoon 
with a larger scope and broader perspective than previous studies in the same 
region. Before this research was conducted, some experiences in fisheries co-
management in Tam Giang have been documented (Truong et al. 2010; Armitage et 
al. 2011b; Takahashi & Duijn 2012). However, these studies or documents only 
focused on the single cases that the authors’ projects worked with. They only 
introduced the co-management system, and procedures to form co-management in 
practice with respect to single cases. This research is the first study to provide 
analysis of the whole co-management system. It considered involvement of and 
linkages between different stakeholders at different levels. It also analysed the 
system by looking at the influence of different projects and the operation of different 
FAs that represented the whole system.  
This study is the first to provide in-depth analysis of the role of the donor-funded 
projects in natural resource management in general and in co-management in 
particular. The role of donors has been recognized in literature but there was a 
dearth of information on the ways the donor-funded projects had impact on resource 
management activities, and the implications of their interventions. This research ha 
helped to fill these gaps in the literature. Therefore, the findings of this research are 
not only important for co-management partners in building successful co-
management but also for the donors in providing effective and efficient funding. 
Fisheries co-management theories have devoted attention to power sharing but it 
has not been analysed adequately in practice. In addition, power sharing has been 
mentioned as general in the co-management literature, there has been little attention 
to the kinds of power that have been shared. More importantly, there has been very 
little information about how the power sharing worked in practice. This research 
makes a considerable contribution to this knowledge.  
Toward analysing factors affecting successful co-management, this research has 
detailed the influence of leaders. Leadership has only been generally analysed in 
previous studies. This is the first study analysing the attributes of an influential leader 
 144 
 
in natural resource management in general, and in fisheries co-management in 
particular. The analysis in this study conveys important messages and implications 
for selecting the most appropriate leaders for effective management of natural 
resources.  
This research has contributed to knowledge about fisheries co-management 
worldwide. As co-management arrangements depend on the social, economic and 
political context in which co-management is built (Pomeroy 2006; Armitage et al. 
2011b), and they cannot be copied from one place to another place (Armitage et al. 
2008), the factors affecting co-management are different from country to country. 
Therefore, this research extends the information available towards improving 
experiences of co-management worldwide. In addition, this research has addressed 
the most concerning issues in co-management: power sharing, legislation, 
institutions and sustainability. Thus this research is beneficial to scholars, 
practitioners and policy makers worldwide for building successful co-management.  
The findings of this study also provide practical and useful contributions and 
implications for co-management stakeholders in Vietnam, where co-management 
systems are still under development. As stated by one of the reviewers of one of the 
papers in this research “I recommend publication of the article [incorporated in 
chapter 7], particularly as there is little information on Vietnamese fisheries and the 
progress and success of co-management in this country”. 
9.4 Limitations of the research  
A limitation was in quantitative data. This research engaged a very good combination 
of qualitative and quantitative research methods, however, the quantitative data had 
some limitations: faults in the collection of income data, and lack of quantitative data 
of fish catch due to weakness in the collection of official data. Though the data on 
fish catch in Tam Giang Lagoon was provided officially by the Department of 
Fisheries Exploitation and Protection, it was advised that the data was an estimated 
figure only. However, this data was not crossed checked due to there being no 
another source of data to do this. 
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This study has provided a comprehensive picture of co-management in Tam Giang 
Lagoon from the design stage to outcomes by 2014. However, some of the findings 
of this research need to be further explored.  
9.5 Further research 
This research has suggested improved institutional arrangements and policy support 
for sustainable co-management. However, because institutional and policy analysis 
was not the main objective of this study, this aspect has not been fully addressed. 
Further institutional and policy analysis for co-management would support the 
success of co-management systems in Vietnam in general and in the Tam Giang 
Lagoon in particular.  
 This study has been conducted at a time when the donor-funded projects have still 
been influencing the implementation of co-management practices though most of the 
support has finished. The results of co-management were therefore reflected quite 
well in relation with the external support. It should be beneficial for the co-
management partners to understand how the co-management system works without 
donor-funded projects and how co-management partners can work together for 
further development of co-management system in other places. Therefore, further 
study on how co-management works and how government and community can 
continue the co-management without external support would be useful for 
sustainable development of co-management. 
As this research explored co-management (between FA and government), it only 
focused on fishers who were members of the FAs. However, some fishers have not 
joined an FA yet. Given this, it is useful  to do further study to understand why some 
fishers did not join FAs and what these fishers think about co-management.  
A continuous research is needed to monitor the progress of co-management 
development in terms of institutional development, policy development, co-
management implementation and results. This study is limited to the data and 
information collected by 2014, and cannot reflect the continued evolution of the co-
management systems.  
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More quantitative research on the ecological, social and economic outcomes of co-
management is needed to inform the results of co-management more 
comprehensively.  
9.6 Final statement: the way forward 
It is time for the government to take over responsibility from the donors and continue 
developing co-management with fishers on their own ways. The government needs 
to take into account the findings and implications of this research and other studies 
as sources of guidance to improve the current co-management system in Tam Giang 
Lagoon and in other parts of Vietnam. In each location, the systems need to fit the 
context and resources of resource users and local government. In particular, 
institutional arrangements need to be improved to strengthen the connection among 
FAs, and between FAs and higher levels. At policy level, it is necessary to have 
reforms in legislation, policies, and administration in order to fully support co-
management. In particular, the national and provincial government need to provide 
concrete policies in terms of human development and financial support for FAs to 
perform their co-management functions and tasks. These need not include an 
annual financial allocation from the government to FAs but strategies and initial 
supports for FAs to create their own income sources are crucial. Secondly 
amendments to legislation are necessary to enable FAs to legally carry out their co-
management functions including fee collection, and handling of violations. Legal 
guarantees from government are also essential to protect FA members who are 
involved in pursuing and sanctioning violators. Thirdly, assessment of fisheries 
resources needs to be undertaken periodically (under the support of the government) 
in order to monitor resources, to adjust the co-management system, to celebrate the 
achievements (if any) of fishers in co-management with government, and most 
importantly, to show what co-management can bring to fishers. The positive results 
of co-management that have good impacts on fishers’ livelihoods will provide strong 
incentives for them to co-manage with government in the long term. Finally, to 
improve the cross-linkages within the co-management system, it is important to 
improve the horizontal links between FAs and the vertical links between FAs and 
other partners. Coordination from a provincial agency is essential to connect the 
FAs. In addition, cooperating activities need to be organized for FAs to give them 
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chances to work together in fisheries management (e.g making plans, organizing 
patrols) and to share and exchange their experiences. The current situation does not 
encourage FAs to actively seek to meet government staff at higher levels (district or 
province) due to lack of facility (e.g. transportation), financial issues (e.g. they cannot 
afford to skip a fishing day without get paid), or their capacity (e.g. poor 
communication skills). In this situation, to shorten the distance between FAs and 
other partners, the government should create some communication channels that 
provide comfortable and convenient ways for FAs to meet and communicate with 
other partners. In addition, building capacity for the FAs’ management board 
members should be another solution to improve the effectiveness of the co-
management system. Once the FA leaders are capable, they are confident to 
participate in co-management activities and actively connect themselves and 
connect to other parties.  
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Annex 1: Profile of Case Studies (Fishery Associations) 
 
Name of FA  
Village 8 Fisheries Association – 
Dien Hai Commune  
Location 
In the north of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Tam Giang Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2007 
Type of FA Fishing  
Having sanctuary? (How 
many?)                 
Yes (01) 
Fishing activities in FA Fish corral, Chinese Lu, gillnet 
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
4 
Number of FA members 61 
Donor-funded projects 
involved in developing and 
implementing of co-
management? 
Nordic Assistance to Vietnam 
(NAV), Regional Fishers Livelihood 
Programme (FAO-Spain) 
Have been allocated with 
TURF? (When?) 
 Yes  (2012)                 
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
100% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management 
activities 
Membership fees, contributions of 
FA members and very small amount 
from violators (fines) 
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Name of FA  
Dong Phong Fisheries Association – 
Huong Phong Commune (Tam Giang 
Lagoon) 
Location 
In the north of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Tam Giang Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2008 
Type of FA Fishing and Aquaculture  
Having sanctuary? (How many?)                        Yes (01) 
Fishing activities in FA Chinese Lu, gillnet, bottom net, lift net,  
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
5 
Number of FA members 89 
Donor-funded projects involved 
in developing and implementing 
of co-management? 
Nordic Assistance to Vietnam (NAV), 
Integrated Management of Lagoon 
Activities (IMOLA) (Italia), Common Pool 
Resources Management (IDRC) 
Have been allocated with TURF? 
(When?) 
No                 
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
70% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management activities 
Only  membership fees  
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Name of FA  
Phu My 1 Fisheries Association – Phu 
My commune  
Location 
In the centre of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Chuon Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2005 
Type of FA Fishing and Aquaculture  
Having sanctuary? (How many?)                        No
Fishing activities in FA 
Net enclosure (aquaculture), Chinese 
Lu, gillnet 
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
5 
Number of FA members 104 
Donor-funded projects involved 
in developing and implementing 
of co-management? 
Common Pool Resources Management 
(IDRC), Integrated Management of 
Lagoon Activities (IMOLA) (Italia) 
Have been allocated with TURF? 
(When?) 
Yes (2010)             
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
80% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management activities 
Only  membership fees  
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Name of FA  
Production Team 16 Fisheries 
Association – Vinh Phu commune  
Location 
In the centre of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Ha Trung-Thuy Tu Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2006 
Type of FA Fishing and Aquaculture  
Having sanctuary? (How many?)                        Yes (01) 
Fishing activities in FA 
Chinese Lu, gillnet, bottom net, lift net, 
fish corral, aquaculture (in ponds and in 
cages)  
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
7 
Number of FA members 76 
Donor-funded projects involved 
in developing and implementing 
of co-management? 
Centre for Social Sciences and 
Humanities (CSSH – a local NGO in 
cooperation with ICCO, an Interchurch 
organisation for development 
cooperation), Centre for Social Research 
and Development (CSRD – a local NGO 
with foreign funds), Global Environmental 
Facility (UNDP) in cooperation with 
Centre for Community Research and 
Development (CCRD – a local NGO). 
Have been allocated with TURF? 
(When?) 
Yes (2012)             
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
32% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management activities 
Renting fishing net, seaweed, 
membership fees , 
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Name of FA  
Mieu Nha Fisheries Association – Dien 
Loc commune  
Location 
In the south of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Cau Hai Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2007 
Type of FA Fishing and Aquaculture  
Having sanctuary? (How many?)                        No
Fishing activities in FA 
Chinese Lu, gillnet, fish corral, 
aquaculture (in ponds and in cages), 
electric sock fishing  
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
7 
Number of FA members 90 
Donor-funded projects involved 
in developing and implementing 
of co-management? 
Integrated Management of Lagoon 
Activities (IMOLA) 
Have been allocated with TURF? 
(When?) 
Yes (2011)           
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
       50% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management activities 
Mainly from membership fees , 
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Name of FA  
Giang Xuan Fisheries Association – Vinh 
Giang commune  
Location 
In the south of Tam Giang Lagoon 
system (Cau Hai Lagoon) 
Year of FA establishment   2008 
Type of FA Fishing and Aquaculture  
Having sanctuary? (How many?)                        Yes (01) 
Fishing activities in FA 
Fish corral, Chinese Lu, gillnet, 
aquaculture (in ponds) 
Number of the members of FA 
executive board  
7 
Number of FA members 115 
Donor-funded projects involved 
in developing and implementing 
of co-management? 
Common Pool Resources Management 
(IDRC), Integrated Management of 
Lagoon Activities (IMOLA) (Italia) 
Have been allocated with TURF? 
(When?) 
Yes (2009)             
What percent of FA members 
paid FA membership fee last 
year?  
95% 
Financial sources for the  
operation of FA including 
fisheries management activities 
Seaweed, resource protection fees, 
violators fines membership fees.  
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Annex 2: Key Questions for Focus Group Discussions 
1. How was fisheries managed before co-management was arranged?   
2. What were the problems of fisheries management? Why co-management?  
3. How was co-management evolved?  
4. How did your community get involved in co-management activities in Tam Giang 
Lagoon? 
5. How was co-management arranged and implemented in your community? 
6. What are advantages and disadvantages of the co-management system?  
7. Who was involved in the co-management processes? What was the role of each 
party? 
8. What made your community interested in a co-management arrangement?  
9. Who had the most influence on the fishers to join FA and conduct co-
management activities?  
10. What co-management activities have been conducted in your FA? 
11. What do you think about the role of donor-funded projects in developing and 
implementing co-management in your FAs and in Tam Giang Lagoon?  
12. To what extent did your FA rely on the donor-funded projects in implementing 
co-management activities?  
13. What do you think about the fishing rights? 
14. What powers does your FA have as a result of being granted with a fishing 
rights? How these power worked in practice?  
15. What do you think about the role of FAs’ leaders in developing and implementing 
co-management?  
16. What are the factors affecting the implementation of co-management in your FA?  
17. What did government, local authorities / community do to maintain the co-
management activities after the external support terminated? 
18. In what way do you think that co-management arrangements benefited your FA? 
19. What are the most significant changes in Tam Giang Lagoon since having FAs 
and co-management?  
20. What are the factors affecting the results of co-management in your FA?  
21. What are the shortcomings of the co-management system? 
22. What are your suggestions for better development of co-management in Tam 
Giang Lagoon?  
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Annex 3: Key Questions for Individual Interviews 
Respondents: Resource managers, Provincial Fishery Association  and project 
staff 
1. How was fisheries managed before co-management was arranged?   
2. What were the problems of fisheries management? Why co-management  
3. How was co-management evolved?  
4. How did you get involved in fisheries management and co-management? 
5. How was co-management started and implemented in Tam Giang Lagoon?  
6. What are advantages and disadvantages of the co-management system?  
7. Who was involved in the co-management processes and what was their role? 
8. What co-management activities have been carried out in Tam Giang Lagoon? 
9. What do you think about the influence of donor-funded projects in developing 
co-management in tam Giang Lagoon? 
10. What do you think about the role of the leaders of FAs in developing and 
implementing co-management? 
11. In what way, do the leaders of FAs have influence on their members?  
12. What do you think about the power of fishers in co-management in Tam Giang 
Lagoon?  
13. What factors affecting the exercise of fishers’ powers?  
14. What did government local authorities / your institutions do to maintain the co-
management activities after the external support terminated? 
15. What do you think about the government policies and legal support for co-
management in Tam Giang Lagoon?  
16. What are the benefits co-management?  
17. What are the most significant changes in Tam Giang Lagoon since having FAs 
and co-management?  
18. What are the factors affecting the results of co-management in Tam Giang 
Lagoon?  
19. In your opinion what are the shortcoming of the co-management system?  
20. What is your advice / are your suggestions for successful co-management in 
Tam Giang Lagoon? 
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Annex 4: Questionnaire 
 
This survey is one of the research activities to fulfill a PhD programme on “Fisheries Co-
management in Tam Giang Lagoon, Vietnam”. We will highly appreciate your contribution 
if you could share with us your experiences and opinions about fisheries co-management 
in Tam Giang Lagoon. Your name and the information provided by you will be kept 
confidential and used for for academic purpose only. Your participation is voluntary.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE CODE 
 
  
NAME OF INTERVIEWER 
 
  
DATE OF SURVEY 
 
  
VILLAGE / COMMUNE / DISTRICT   
NAME OF  
FISHERY ASSOCIATION (FA) 
 
 
 
1. RESPONDENT’S RELATED INFORMATION 
 
1.1. Age  
1.2. Sex  Male 
1        Female 2 
1.3.  Literacy   Illiterate 
1   Literate 2  
1.4. Classification of 
household by prosperity 
 Certified poor 1   Observed poor 2   Not poor 3 
1.5. Classification of 
household by main career 
 Mobile gear fishing 1     Fixed gear fishing 2     
 Aquaculture 3           Other (Specify):        
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1.6. Aquaculture and fishing 
activities involved 
(Multiple choice allowed) 
 Upper earth pond aqua. 1    Lower earth pond aqua. 2     
 Net enclosure aqua 3      Cage aqua 4 
 Fish corral 5       Bottom net 6     Lifting net 7               
Fish aggregating device 8     Chinese Lu 9    Gill net 10  
 Others (Specify):      
1.7. Year joined FA  
1.8. Are you a member of the 
FA Executive Board 
(former or current)  
 Yes 1      No 2    Position if any:______________ 
 
 
2. CO-MANAGEMENT BUILDING  
 
2.1. Why did you join FA ? (Multiple choice allowed)  
 
 Be forced by someone 1 – who are they_______________________ 
 Incentive / benefit-driven 2 
 Resolve conflict 3 
 Stop illegal fishing activities 4 
 Believe in FA executive board 5 
 Just for fun 6 
 No specific reason 7 
 Others (specify) 
 
2.2. Who / what had influenced your decision of joining FA? (Multiple choice 
allowed) 
 
 No one (you made decision by yourself) 1 
 FA executive board 2 
 FA members 3 
 Family members 4 
 Government officials 5  Commune a  District b  Province 
 Project staff 6 
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 Project terms and conditions to benefit 7 
 Others 
(Specify)_____________________________________________________ 
 
3. CO-MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION  
 
3.1. What co-management activities have you participated in since joining the FA? 
(Multiple choice allowed)  
 
 None0 
Developing FA regulations1 
Enforcing FA regulations2 
Monitoring the compliance with FA regulations of other fishers3 
Reporting violators4 
Patrolling5 
Pursuing violators6 
Participating in sanction process7 
Gathering and reporting fisheries resource data and violating information8  
Participating in making plans for fisheries resource use and development9 
 Do not remember 10 
 Others (specify)_________________________________________________ 
 
If the answer to this question is “None”, go to question 3.5 
 
3.2. Why did you participate in co-management activities? (Multiple choice allowed) 
 
 Be forced by someone 1 – who are they_______________________ 
 Incentive / benefit-driven (e.g Financial benefits from co-management 
projects) 2 
 Resolve conflict 3 
 Prevent illegal fishing activities 4 
 Being encouraged by a FA leader5 (the leader tried to convince fisher) 
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 Believing in FA leaders 6 (Being influenced by the leader and followed the 
leaders) 
⤷ to what level do you believe in the FA leaders?    1 (lowest)  2   3   4   5 (highest) 
 Follow what others do 7 
 No specific reason 8 
 Others (specify) _____________________________ 
 
3.3. From whom did you receive support (training, materials, money) for conducting 
the co-management activities?  
 
  No one1   
  FA2   
  Government funds3   
  External funds (donor funded projects / foreign aids)4   
 Don’t know5  
  Not applicable6 
 Others (specify)______________________________________________ 
  
3.4. How has your participation in co-management activities changed since the 
external support finished in your FA? 
 
   Decreased 0    Stayed the same 1   Increased 2 
  
 
3.5. In your opinion to what extent did the implementation of co-management 
activities depend on the external support?  
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
     (Lowest)       (Highest) 
 
3.6. In general, how do you think that the participation of other members in your FA 
in co-management activities have changed since the external support finished? 
 
 Decreased 0     Not change 1    Increased 2  
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3.7. Do you think that the co-management activities would be continued without any 
external support?  
 
 Yes 1        No 2   Do not know 3  Not applicable 4 
 
3.8. In your opinion, what are the conditions for you as an individual to continue 
participating in co-management activities? 
 
 Receiving Financial support 1    
 Having personal safety protected and secured2   
 Fair and clear responsibility and benefits among FA members 3   
 FA executive board members showing reputation, reliability and prestige 4  
 Effective sanction of violator 5   
 Other, specify 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. CO-MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES  
 
4.1. In your opinion, how has the fishery resources changed since 2009?  
 
 Decreased Stayed 
the same 
Increased Don’t 
know 
a. Your total fish catch  0 1 2 3 
b. The species diversity of 
fish you catch 
0 1 2 3 
c. The size of fish you catch  0 1 2 3 
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4.2. What do you think about the change in the following issues since 2009?  
 
 Getting 
worse 
No 
change 
Improved Don’t 
know 
a. Destruction of fish corrals 0 1 2 3 
b. Use of destructive fishing 0 1 2 3 
c. Fishing in protected areas 0 1 2 3 
d. Conflicts between lagoon 
users 
0 1 2 3 
e. Use of small mesh size 0 1 2 3 
 
4.3. How has your family’s income changed since 2009?  
 
 Decreased Stayed 
the 
same 
Increased Don’t 
know 
Household income 0 1 2 3 
Income from fishing 0 1 2 3 
Income from fish coral  0 1 2 3 
Income from Chinese Lu  0 1 2 3 
Income from gillnet 0 1 2 3 
Others________________________ 0 1 2 3 
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4.4. Please provide your household income in 2009 and in 2013?  
 
 2009  
(mil VND) 
2013 
(Mil VND) 
Household income   
Income from fishing   
Income from fish coral    
Income from Chinese Lu    
Income from gillnet   
 
4.5. How did you comply with FA regulations on fisheries management on the 
following aspects? 
 
Regulation  
Regulation 
compliance  
(Yes, No, 
N/A) 
Provide differences if any 
On regulation In practice 
Number of Lu per 
household 
 
  
No of gillnets per 
household 
 
  
Mesh size     
Contributing 
fisheries protection 
fee  
 
  
Fishing season and 
location 
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4.6. In your opinion how is co-management beneficial to the lagoon resources? 
  
 Yes No Not 
sure 
No 
idea 
a. Improving resource abundance 1 2 3 4 
b. Improving community wellbeing  1 2 3 4 
c. Improving equity in resource access 
and use 
1 2 3 4 
d. Revolving conflict among resource 
users 
1 2 3 4 
e. Reducing illegal fishing activities  1 2 3 4 
f. Others 
_________________________ 
    
g. Don’t know     
 
Is there anything else you would like to tell us about co-management or how it 
affects fisheries resources and your family? 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Thank you for your time and cooperation  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
This study adheres to the Guidelines of the ethical review process of The University 
of Queensland. Whilst you are free to discuss your participation in this study with 
project staff (contactable on 0468958865 or thachnga2002@gmail.com), if you would 
like to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may contact 
the Ethics Officer, Dr Simon Somogyi, on (+61)754601107 or email to 
s.somogyi@uq.edu.au.  
 
